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Burning Crosses on Campus:
University Hate Speech Codes
ALEXANDER TSESIS
Debates about the value and constitutionality of hate speech regulations on
college campuses have deeply divided academicsfor over a decade. The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Virginia v. Black, recognizinga state's power to criminalize
intentionally intimidatingcross burning at long last provides the key to resolving this
heated dispute. The opponents of hate speech codes argue that such regulation guts
our concept offree speech. One prominent scholarclaims that this censorship would
Another
nullify the First Amendment and have "totalitarian implications."
constitutional expert, Erwin Chemerinsky, asserts that the "public university simply
cannot prohibit the expression of hate, including antisemitism, without running afoul
of[establishedFirstAmendment principles]."
On the other end of the spectrum are authorswho argue that hate speech attacks
individuals' FourteenthAmendment right to equality, which outweighs any cathartic
desire to degrade people because of their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and
religion. This line of thinking recognizes the fundamental right to free speech but
argues that it can be restrainedwhen used to intrude on others' dignity rights. The
advocates of campus hate speech codes claim that a college's mission to further
intellectualfreedom is not undermined by restricting intimidating speech on campus;
consequently, some scholars argue that curbing racist and xenophobic speech would
not undermine the core purpose of higher education-theacquisition of truth.
Both factions have relied on the Supreme Court's FirstAmendment precedents to
bolster their claims. This Article adds a fresh perspective to this decades-old
academic tempest of intellectual disagreement about FirstAmendment theory. It first
discusses the currentproblem of hate speech on college campuses. It then turns to a
survey of First Amendment jurisprudence that is relevant to the regulation of hate
speech on campus. Then it compares andcontrasts internationalapproachesto that of
the United States. The final portion of the Article analyzes the narrow and broad
implications of the Supreme Court's rationalin Virginia v. Black to develop two forms
of college hate speech regulations that are likely to withstand First Amendment
challenges.
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Burning Crosses on Campus:
University Hate Speech Codes
ALEXANDER TSESIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most divisive First Amendment debates of the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries has been about the constitutionality of
university hate speech regulations. The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Virginia v. Black,' recognizing a state's power to criminalize
intentionally intimidating cross burning,2 provides the key to resolving this
heated dispute. The opponents of hate speech codes argue that their
enforcement contravenes the American commitment to the preservation of
free speech.3 One prominent scholar claims that this censorship would
nullify the First Amendment and have "totalitarian implications.'A
Another constitutional expert, Erwin Chemerinsky, asserts that the "public
university simply cannot prohibit the expression of hate, including
antisemitism, without running afoul of [established First Amendment
principles]."s
On the other end of the spectrum are authors who argue that hate
speech attacks individuals' Fourteenth Amendment right to equality, which
outweighs any cathartic desire to degrade people because of their race,
This line of thinking
ethnicity, sexual orientation, or nationality.6
recognizes the fundamental right to free speech but argues that it can be

* Loyola University School of Law, Chicago. I am indebted to William M. Carter, Jr., Jessie
Hill, Darrell A.H. Miller, Robert A. Kahn, Josh Rubin, and Nathan R. Sellers for comments on an
earlier draft.
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
Id. at 363.
Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 71, 73 (1996).
David E. Bernstein, Defending the FirstAmendment from AntidiscriminationLaws, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 223, 240-41 (2003).
Erwin Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, Is a FirstAmendment
Issue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.765, 770 (2009) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech).
6 See Onder Bakircioglu, Freedom ofExpressionand Hate Speech, 16 TuLSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
1, 18 (2008) ("[T]he state ... has a responsibility to diminish the conditions that create inequality. . . .
The protection of hate speech hence might at times conflict with the right to equality. . . ."); Thomas P.
Crocker, DisplacingDissent: The Role of "Place" in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2587, 2613 (2007) (noting that the meaning of particular speech has mattered in debate over
speech regulations); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision,85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 383-87 (1991) (discussing the harmful effects of racist speech).
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restrained when used to intrude on others' dignity rights. The advocates
of campus hate speech codes claim that their aims are not novel. They are
construed as a balancing of interests that is already commonplace with
other limitations on speech, such as those enforced through copyright,
libel, conspiracy, and fighting words statutes. A college's mission to
further intellectual freedom is unimpaired by limitations on intimidating
campus expression; consequently, some scholars argue that curbing racist
and xenophobic speech would not undermine the core purpose of higher
education, the acquisition of truth.9 This school of thought holds either
that hate speech is outside the scope of the First Amendment or
counterbalanced by weightier social considerations.'
Both factions have relied on the Supreme Court's free speech
jurisprudence to bolster their claims. Opponents of university hate speech
regulations have often relied on R.A. V v. St. Paul," in which the majority
found a municipal ordinance against cross burning to be unconstitutional.12
Following the rationale of that case, libertarians and several lower federal
courts have asserted that university administrators lack the authority to
prevent the spread of vitriol, no matter how racist, xenophobic, or sexist.'3
Eleven years after deciding R.A. V, in a quiet coup, the Court upheld a
more rigorously drafted cross burning statute than the one struck down in
R.A. V The later decision, Virginia v. Black,14 defined the scope of
legitimate limitations on destructive messages. Given its substantial
Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech, Public Discourse, and the First Amendment, in EXTREME
SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 158, 160, 163 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009).
8Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of
PaternalisticObjections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 871, 883, 892 (1994).
9 Richard A. Glenn & Otis H. Stephens, Campus Hate Speech and Equal Protection:Competing
ConstitutionalValues, 6 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 349, 363 (1997).
'o See id. at 362-63 ("This type of speech feeds prejudice and may be undeserving of First
Amendment protection. Hate speech is subject to limitation if the intent of the speaker is not to
advance or acquire knowledge, but rather to injure and destroy the victim.").
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 391.
13 This Article proposes a more narrowly constructed hate speech code than the ones
struck in
lower court decisions. Those district and circuit court cases were issued long before Virginia v. Black,
which is the Supreme Court decision I primarily rely on to develop a campus incitement plan. The
most commonly cited of these earlier cases, Doe v. University of Michigan, was decided at the district
court level. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The case involved a University of Michigan code
prohibiting "individuals, under the penalty of sanctions, from 'stigmatizing or victimizing' individuals
or groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status." Id. at 853. Michigan had
instituted the anti-harassment policy as part of its effort to deal with the increased frequency of racist
incidents on campus. Id. at 854-55. The court held that enforcement of such a "vague" policy would
violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 867. Another much discussed federal district court case held that
the University of Wisconsin's hate speech code was likewise unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.
UMW Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1178-79 (E.D. Wis.
1991). Because these decisions were not binding precedents, many colleges outside the courts'
jurisdictions retained their codes. JON B. GOULD, SPEAK NO EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH
REGULATION 159 (2005).
" 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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impact on First Amendment jurisprudence, it has received surprisingly
inadequate treatment in the academic literature. I extend the Supreme
Court's rationale to hate speech that can intimidate minority groups as well
as individuals-a controversial point, to say the least, since so many
specialists erroneously believe group defamation is no longer actionable.
My point, however, is that college hate speech codes serve a public good
by preventing the dissemination of menacing stereotypes, symbols, and
statements that deter people from enjoying the intellectual life of a
Universities can limit hate speech that aims to stifle
university.
conversation by putting members of the campus community in fear for
their well-being.
This Article adds a fresh perspective to this decades-old academic
tempest of intellectual disagreement about First Amendment theory. It
first discusses the current problem of hate speech on college campuses. It
then turns to a survey of First Amendment jurisprudence that is relevant to
the regulation of hate speech on campus. Then it provides a comparative
analysis of international and European regulations of hate speech,
comparing and contrasting international approaches to that of the United
States. That analysis lays the groundwork for developing hate speech
codes that are informed by international norms without violating the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech. The final portion of the Article
analyzes the narrow and broad implications of the Supreme Court's
rationale in Black to develop two forms of college hate speech regulations
that are likely to withstand First Amendment challenges.
II. HATE SPEECH ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES
Numerous incidents of hate speech have occurred on American college
campuses. Their increased frequency speaks to the need to develop
constitutionally sound campus hate speech codes designed to prevent the
alienation and intimidation of targeted students. Before delving into what
forms of speech colleges can constitutionally restrict, this section provides
sociological background indicating the extent of the problem.
There are strong differences of opinion as to what constitutes hate
speech. For example, when Columbia University invited Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to speak on campus, many elected and private
individuals decried the decision to provide a forum for a well-known
denier of the Holocaust and supporter of terror.15 Others, to the contrary,
See Amotz Asa-El, Editorial, Value of Free Speech Twisted at Columbia, SEATTLE POSTOct. 3, 2007, at B6 (stating that Ahmadinejad is a "narrow-minded populist" who is
"tactless" and "intellectual[ly] limit[ed]"); Barbara Banaian, Op-Ed., President's Speech Had No
Purpose,ST. CLOUD TIMES (Minn.), Oct. 5, 2007, at 4B (arguing that Ahmadinejad's speech served no
educational purpose); Irwin Cotler, Op-Ed., Ahmadinejad and InternationalLaw, JERUSALEM POST,
Oct. 3, 2007, at 15 (arguing that Ahmadinejad should not have been given a forum to speak because of
'

INTELLIGENCER,
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regarded his appearance there to be a legitimate part of the university's
educational mission because it provided an opportunity to voice
differences of opinion.16
Hate speech that is overtly derogatory toward vulnerable groups
persistently occurs on college campuses. Jewish students at several U.S.
universities have recently been the targets of a growing number of
antisemitic incidents.17 An Anti-Defamation League audit found there
were ninety-four antisemitic incidents on U.S. campuses in 2007,
representing about six percent of total anti-Jewish harassment and
vandalism that year." This frequency speaks to the need to develop
constitutionally sound campus hate speech codes designed to prevent the
alienation and intimidation of targeted students.
Jewish students at the University of California, Irvine ("UC-Irvine")
report that antagonism has grown to such an extent that they travel the
outskirts of campus to avoid conflict, are reluctant to engage in activities
sponsored by Jewish organizations, and have trouble focusing on their
studies.' 9 Imam Mohammad Al-Asi and Amir Abdel Malik Ali made
speeches at a week-long event at UC-Irvine that wedded traditional
stereotypes with modern events, claiming that Jews are in control of U.S.
media and responsible for the terror on September 11, 2001. In one speech
Al-Asi asserted, "'[w]e have a psychosis in the Jewish community that is
unable to co-exist equally and brotherly with other human beings."' 20 lIn
2010, the Muslim Student Union at UC-Irvine, which the University
subsequently banned, brought in a speaker who "compared Jews to Nazis"
and "expressed support for Hamas, Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad." 21
his alleged incitement to genocide); Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at Columbia, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(D.C.), Oct. 5, 2007, at 4 (surveying a variety of views on Ahmadinejad's invitation to Columbia
University and Columbia President Lee Bollinger's criticism of the Iranian president); Rep. Calvert
Denounces PresidentAhmadinejad's Visit to U.S., U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 28, 2007 ("There is great
irony that Ahmadinejad, who has openly called America '[t]he Great Satan' and threatened to wipe one
of our allies 'off the map,' is allowed to speak freely without fear of repercussion.").
16See, e.g., Sheryl McCarthy, Editorial, "Madman " Tag Is Counterproductive,AUGUSTA CHRON.
(Ga.), Oct. 4, 2007, at A05 (criticizing the actions of Columbia's president for being
"counterproductive" and "insult[ing]" to Ahmadinejad); Zohreh Rastegar, The Belligerent Lee
Bollinger, NEWsRELEASEWIRE.COM, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://expertclick.com/NewsRelease
Wire/ReleaseDetails.aspx?ID=18157&CFID-154679&CFTOKEN=81626502 (arguing it was not the
Iranian President's but President Bollinger's speech that was offensive); Jonathan Zimmerman, Hate
Acts, Hate Words Bear Great Distinction, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Sept. 30, 2007,
at G04 (stating that the best way to disseminate knowledge is through different points of view).
" Susan B. Tuchman, Jewish Students of America, Know Your Legal Rights, JERUSALEM POST,
(Dec. 11, 2005), http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=7091.
18Sonia Scherr, Anti-Semitism Goes to School, INTELLIGENCE REP., Fall 2008, at 19, 19,
available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2008/fall/antisemitism-goes-to-school.
19Tuchman, supra note 17.
20 Scherr, supra note 18, at 20.
21 E.B. Solomont, Irvine Muslim Student Union Suspended, JERUSALEM POST, (June 15, 2010),
http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=l 78434.
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In two separate incidents at the University of California, Berkeley
("UC-Berkeley"), swastikas were scrawled on a Jewish student
organization's pamphlet and an anti-Palestinian message appeared
At the California Polytechnic
scrawled on a campus building.22
University, students reported seeing a Confederate flag and a noose
hanging in a residence hall, as well as a sign featuring racist and
23
University attorneys and law enforcement
homophobic statements.23
officials presumed, incorrectly as I will demonstrate later, that the First
Amendment protects such speech.24 In light of their advice, the president
of the university issued a written reprimand but refused to punish the
perpetrators.25 In Eugene, Oregon, several "hate speech-related crime[s]"
followed the appearances of Holocaust denier David Irving and Ku Klux
Klan supporter Tomislav Sunic at group-sponsored forums held on the
University of Oregon campus.26
Universities and policymakers have drafted, or have considered
drafting, a variety of responses to these types of incidents. The University
of Nevada, Las Vegas ("UNLV") is considering instituting a campus hate
crime policy that would include a prohibition against expressions
Hate Speech Roils UC Berkeley Campus, N.Y. JEWISH WEEK, Sept. 26, 2008, at 50; see also
Rebecca Wallace, UC-Berkeley: U CaliforniaBerkeley Groups React to Recent Acts of "Hate Speech"
Vandalism, DAILY CALIFORNIAN, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.dailycal.org/article/
102745/campusgroups react to recent-acts of hate-speech (reporting incidents of antisemitic and
retaliatory vandalism on UC-Berkeley's campus).
23 Nick Wilson, Confronting Signs of Hale, TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo, Cal.), Nov. 7, 2008, at
Al; see also Johnna Pinholster, Community Discussion Tackles Southern Heritage, Symbolism,
VALDOSTA DAILY TIMES (Ga.), Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.valdostadailytimes.com/
archivesearch/local story_271232024.html (relating a public discussion at Valdosta State University
about polarizing symbols like Confederate flags on campus); Alex Vaughn, Professors Give Historic
Perspective, TECHNICIAN (N.C. State Univ.) (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.technicianonline.com/news/
professors-give-historic-perspective-1.1042145 (reporting on a prospective teach-in about hate images,
such as the Confederate flag, lynching, and the Ku Klux Klan, scrawled in the school's "Free
Expression Tunnel").
24Nick Wilson, Incident at Cal Poly: Hundreds Urge Tolerance over Display of Hate Signs,
TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo, Cal.), Nov. 13, 2008, at Al. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of why the
First Amendment does not protect hate speech.
25 Press Release, Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., Cal Poly President Issues Second Letter to Campus
Supporting Diversity, Announcing University Meetings, Nov. 4, 2008, available at
http://calpolynews.calpoly.edulnewsreleases/2008/November/Baker-message.html.
26 Jack Moran, Hate-FilledGraffiti Spurs Vigil, Concerns, REG.-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), June 24,
2008, at A. Concerning David Irving's Holocaust denial, see ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE
22

MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 188 (2002)

[hereinafter TSESIs, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES). The best full-length account of the David Irving trial in
Germany is RICHARD J. EVANS, LYING ABOUT HITLER: HISTORY, HOLOCAUST, AND THE DAVID

IRVING TRIAL 185-266 (2001). Irving sued Penguin Books and Professor Deborah Lipstadt for
allegedly libeling him as a Nazi apologist and Holocaust denier. The High Court held that Irving was
both a Holocaust denier and antisemitic. Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., (2000] EWHC (Civ) 115,
A
13.91-13.108 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2000/l15.html.
Vienna Court later sentenced Irving to three years in jail. Anne Applebaum, Tolerating the Intolerable,
BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 2, 2006, at A7. Irving, though, only served one year of the sentence behind bars.
Luke Salkeld, Riot FearAfter Oxford Invites BNP to Debate, DAILY MAIL (London), Nov. 26, 2007, at
20.
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motivated by racial, religious, gender, and political bias.27 In the spring of
2009, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission held an open public forum
for better understanding the testimonies of student victims of hate speech
and balancing them against others' free speech concerns. 28 At th
the
University of Rhode Island, the provost, Donald H. DeHayes, supported a
university police investigation of hateful, racist epithets made against then
presidential candidate Barack Obama. 29 And at Auburn University, the
multicultural center suggested sponsoring an event on hate speech after a
professor received a racist note.
Other universities have instituted aspirational civility statements for
preventing the use of prejudicial slurs.3 1 The University of Chicago, for
instance, requests that its community foster the marketplace of ideas by
preserving the diversity, civility, and equality of its campus. 32 St.
Scholastica College in Duluth, Minnesota, issued .a similar statement to
students after hate symbols appeared on its campus, as did two other
colleges in the state.33
Some of these incidents of hate speech have been isolated events.
Others appeared to be part of a concerted effort to make certain groups feel
uncomfortable, threatened, or isolated. The location of these events, often
occurring hundreds or even thousands of miles from each other, suggests
that the expression of intimidating bigotry is not a localized problem. But
can anything be done to combat this trend? Are all or any of the recent
expressions of hate on campus protected by the First Amendment? Indeed,
only constitutional solutions are warranted. Mere discomfort or disdain is
no justification for diminishing an individual's right of self-expression, no
matter how morally reprehensible the message might be. Free speech
jurisprudence shows that universities do not have a free hand when it
comes to regulating hate speech, but they are not without recourse when
destructive messages intentionally incite criminal behavior against
identifiable groups.
27 ControllingSpeech UNL V Policy Goes Too Farin Trying To Stop Harassment, Treads on the
FirstAmendment, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 28, 2009, at 4. The most recently reported UNLV draft policy
on hate crimes contains a provision against intimidation and harassment. Richard Lake, UNL V
Rewrites Policy on Hate Crimes, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 3, 2009, at 2B.
28 Press Release, Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights, Michigan Civil Rights Commission Seeks Student
Victims of Campus Hate for Testimony (Mar. 27, 2008), http://michigan.gov/mdcr/0,1607,7-1384952_4995-188497--,00.html. A similar public forum was held in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to
discuss the issue of hate crimes and hate speech policy for public universities. Eric Ferreri, UNC
Commission Hears Pleas To CreateHate-Crimes Policy, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 16,
2009, at B2.
29
Kate Bramson, URI Probes Hate Speech Messages, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 24, 2008, at 2.
3
oHannah Wolfson, Auburn Professor Reports Racist Note, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 22, 2008,
at 6B.
" Marilyn Gilroy, Colleges Grapplingwith Incivility, 18 HISP. OUTLOOK INHIGHER ED. 8 (2008),
reprinted in 74 EDUC. DIG. 36, 37 (2008).
32 Id
3
Duluth College Reaffirms Hate Crime Policy,ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 28, 2008, at B2.
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III. U.S. JURISPRUDENCE
College administrators have taken several approaches in response to
recent expressions of hatred at American universities. 34 Inevitably, each
university is a self-governing body that sets its own policies. In
developing approaches uniquely designed to combat hate speech at their
separate universities, all administrators must be conscious not to infringe
on individuals' First Amendment rights.
A. FoundationsofFirstAmendment Law
Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes the extent to which the state
can impose limitations on expression. While speech is among the foremost
of individual rights, states can prohibit a limited class of expressions that
are harmful to individuals' reputational, property, and dignitary interests.3 5
Contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence developed in the early
Three of the most prominent cases arose with the
twentieth century.
prosecution of defendants under the Espionage Act of 1917.3 The most
often cited of the three, Schenck v. United States, affirmed the conviction
of a socialist who conspired to distribute leaflets against forced military
conscription during World War 1.38 Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes recognized that the government suppression of statements
against the war involved more than ordinary criminal issues. 39 The Court
upheld prosecution under the law but developed a test to prevent
government overreaching to suppress protected speech. Federal and state
statutes could only prevent the freedom of expression when the message
posed "a clear and present danger" of achieving some "substantive evil[]"
that the government "has a right to prevent.""0 This test allowed for the
proscription of speech when it was likely to soon cause criminal conduct,

34See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
35 See Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 389, 394-95
(2004) (noting that "[c]ontemporary jurisprudence recognizes the constitutionality of laws" restricting
speech that is harmful to these interests).
36 For a history of free speech in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, see generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870-1920
(1997). Stephen M. Feldman has also published a detail-rich historical narrative on this subject, FREE
EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2008).
37 See Act of June 15, 1917, Pub L. No. 65-24, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (amended 1997)
(punishing the expression of sentiments that undermine war efforts). The three cases are: Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); and Schenck v.
UnitedStates, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). For early criticism of the Espionage Act, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Freedom ofSpeech in War Time, 32 HARv. L. REV. 932, 973 (1919). A significantly more deferential
contemporary approach to the restrictions on wartime speech is found in Edward S. Corwin, Freedom
of Speech and Press Under the FirstAmendment: A Resumd, 30 YALE L.J. 48, 55 (1920).
3 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49-50, 53.
3
Id. at 52.
40 id
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such as violence, but not when the message itself was obnoxious. 1
While Shenck appears to establish a "clear and present danger" rule, no
one case could by itself develop the foundations of First Amendment
jurisprudence. Just seven days after it decided Schenck, in a closely related
case, Frohwerk v. United States, the Court upheld a ten-year prison

sentence against a German-born newspaper editor for attempting to cause
"disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military" during the First
World War.42 At his sentencing hearing, the defendant dejectedly declared
his loyalty to the United States and his hatred for "kaizerism"; in turn, the
trial judge expressed his respect for German culture.4 3 Once again writing
for the majority, Holmes recognized that the First Amendment "obviously
was not[] intended to give immunity for every possible use of language.""
His rationale reflected on the particular circumstances of publication
leading to the defendant's harsh conviction, finding that the newspaper was
circulated in areas "where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame
and that the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper
out."'A While it is highly improbable that an appeal from any prosecution
of criticism against the current War on Terror would find so sympathetic a
Court, nothing indicates that the principle of Frohwerk has been overruled.
The opinion established government's ability to criminalize advocacy to
commit criminal acts in circumstances that pose a clear and present danger
of serious harm, but it did not grant government a license to impede
criticism of the war, even during the course of belligerency. What remains
is the principle that, where language instigates violence or threatens
violence, it can be regulated without violating the speakers' First
41 Judge Learned Hand further elaborated the test: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), af'd, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). As with so many of Judge Learned Hand's articulations, the significance of this one
went well beyond the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court has accepted the passage several times both
in its rulings and in dicta. E.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 453 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36,
64 (1961); Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
42 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205-06, 210. The Missouri state case is unreported in Westlaw and
Lexis, but details about it appear at 12 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS xxix-xxx (John D. Lawson ed., 1919).
Jacob Frohwerk was the president of the Kansas branch of the National German-American Alliance. In
his testimony before a United States Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, he stated that
neither he nor the organization had any connection or received any money from the German
government. National German-AmericanAlliance: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary on S. 3529, 65th Cong. 199 (1918) (testimony of Jacob Frohwerk, President, National
German-American Alliance-State Alliance of Kansas). The Senate Subcommittee grilled Frohwerk
about his organization's political activism against the export of munitions during World War I. Id. at
200. Frohwerk was an editor of The Missouri Staats Zeitung, which published editorials against
performing military service. Two MissouriEditors Held, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1918, at 7.
43Frohwerk Gets Ten Years, CHILLICOTHE CONSTITUTION (Mo.), July 1, 1918, at 3; see also
German EditorsArrested, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1918, at 6.
4 Frohwerk,249 U.S. at 206.
45

Id. at 209.
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Amendment rights. The reason for this leeway in the regulation of
dangerous speech is that it does not further the underlying rationale for free
speech. Intimidation is neither a step toward truth in the marketplace of
ideas nor related to democratic self-governance.
In the final case of this trilogy, Debs v. United States, which also
upheld a conviction for seeking to incite insubordination of the military, 46
the Court inferred the speaker's advocacy from his choice of words, which
tended "to obstruct the recruiting service." 47 The significance of the ruling
lies in the judicial power to assess whether speech has the "natural
tendency and reasonably probable effect" of convincing audiences to
commit illegal acts.48 Taken together, the doctrine announced in Schenck,
Frohwerk,and Debs allows for the use of circumstantial evidence to prove
the clear and present danger of harm from speech.
These precedents established that government can prohibit speech
whose content and context tends to cause a clear and present danger that
likely will trigger serious illegal acts. While Holmes later tempered this
principle by making it only applicable to extreme cases, these three rulings
remain pivotal to First Amendment jurisprudence. His dissent in Abrams
v. United States49 qualified his earlier opinions, and demonstrated a
heightened sensitivity to the dangers of suppressing ideas that are unrelated
to harmful incitement.50 Most critically, Holmes's dissent in Abrams
provided a more stringent test to prevent the judiciary's zealous oversupport for executive department wartime action that had led to the arrest
and conviction of men who had merely expressed opposition to World War
I.
Abrams was one of five Russian-born anarchists convicted for urging
munitions workers to go on strike in opposition to "barbaric intervention"
4 249 U.S. 211, 212, 217 (1919).
4Id. at 216. Eugene V. Debs, the

subject of prosecution in this case was a socialist leader who
became famous for his efforts on behalf of working people and his unsuccessful runs for the United
States presidency. NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST 342-45 (1984). Debs
argued that the military draft was a capitalist plan to conscript working men against their class interests.
ERNEST FREEBERG, DEMOCRACY'S PRISONER: EUGENE V. DEBS, THE GREAT WAR, AND THE RIGHT To
DISSENT 45, 55 (2008). He was convicted for violating the Espionage Act of 1917. GEOFFREY R.
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR
ON TERRORISM 196-97 (2004). After Debs was jailed, President Harding commuted his sentence and
invited him for a private conversation at the White House. JOHN W. DEAN, WARREN G. HARDING 128

(2004).
Debs, 249 U.S. at 216.
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
sold. at 630-31. For a list of diverging opinions about whether Holmes's views on the First
Amendment changed between Schenck and Abrams, see Stephen M. Feldman, Free Speech, World War
I, and Republican Democracy: The Internaland External Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 192, 194
n.7 (2008). The Holmes dissent in Abrams has been variously regarded as a change in his thinking, an
inconsistency in his First Amendment approach, or a response to legislative developments. Thomas A.
Balmer, "Present Appreciation and Future Advantage": A Note on the Influence of Hobbes and
Holmes, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 412,430 (2005).
4'
49
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of the United States into the Russian Civil War between the Bolsheviks
and the White Armies." Abrams was part of a group of anarchist and
socialist immigrants from Russia who wrote, printed, and distributed
leaflets urging opposition to U.S. policy.5 2 The three principal organizers
were sentenced to twenty years in prison, and another received a fifteenThe Court gave little explanation for upholding the
year sentence.
54
convictions except to say that it was following Schenck and Frohwerk.
While the majority's analysis is not particularly memorable, Holmes's
dissent has had an enormous influence on the evolution of free speech
doctrine. Holmes opposed the conviction because he regarded it to be an
impermissible suppression of relatively innocuous political ideas; the state,
he wrote, can only legitimately restrict speech that poses "the present
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about." 5 Abrams posed
no immediate danger since he had no specific intent to overthrow the
government. The harsh prison sentence, as Holmes saw it, was imposed to
prevent Abrams from expressing personal views supporting the newly
installed Soviet government. 56 Of even greater consequence than his
exposition of the case, was Holmes's philosophy of free speech. Known as
the "marketplace of ideas" doctrine, it posits that "the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out."57
This doctrinal formulation raises very complex questions of
construction; perhaps the most complicated ones are how a judge is to
determine what the nature of "truth" is and the extent to which the First
Amendment protects unenlightening expressions. Surely truth-seeking is
not the entire range of constitutionally protected speech. The First

" SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 329-30

(1989); see also Stewart Jay, The Creationof the FirstAmendment Right to FreeExpression: From the
Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 845 (2008) (noting
that "American military intervention on behalf of the White armies fighting Russian Bolsheviks" was
the target of the defendants' activities).
5 MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL
LIBERTARIANISM 80-81 (1991); POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT I

(Ron Christenson ed., 1991); STONE, supranote 47, at 205.
" CLEMENS P. WORK, DARKEST BEFORE DAWN: SEDITION AND FREE SPEECH IN THE AMERICAN
WEST 250 (2005); Exult as Bolshevikis, FORT WAYNE NEws & SENTINEL (Fort Wayne, id.), Oct. 25,
1918, at 8.
54
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 618-19.
56 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Not only were the prison sentences of the group of pamphleteers
' Id. at 629-30.
incommensurable to their calls for a labor strike, but the police beat the defendants. ALAN M.

DERSHOWITZ, AMERICA ON TRIAL: INSIDE THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT TRANSFORMED OUR NATION

230 (2004).
" Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Amendment, for instance, protects parodyss and pornography," even
though neither mode of expression necessarily weighs the validity of ideas.
A further weakness with Holmes's "market place of ideas" test is its
disregard for how wealth disparities differentiate persons' abilities to have
their message heard. Sometimes having more resources can make it easier
to convince audiences of the validity of false ideas because the source of
the correct ones lacks the means to air them on prominent outlets, like
television and radio. Well-funded, but wrong-headed, organizations
exploiting media contacts are sometimes more likely to influence
audiences than paupers with sound theories but inadequate access to the
airwaves or broadband.o
The Holmes decisions provide university administrators with guidance
for preventing dangerous speech. By themselves, however, they leave the
impression that only the most immediately threatening expressions can be
excluded from the marketplace of ideas. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court has on numerous occasions recognized that speech is not an absolute
right.6' A variety of restrictions on speech, such as copyright statutes62 and

1 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, Inc., 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (holding that the
First
Amendment protects parody that "could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts
about the public figure involved").
s9Supreme Court jurisprudence distinguishes "pornography" and "obscenity."
Unlike
pornography, at least in certain forms, obscenity is an unprotected form of communication. See
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239-41, 258 (2002) (finding that "virtual child
pornography" using computer graphics is a protected form of communication); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 31-32 (1973) (defining obscenity within the context of "'contemporary community
standards"' (quoting Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966))); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("[O]bscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press."). But see Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108, 111 (1990) (holding that a state may
constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (upholding a state statute prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting
depictions of sexual performances involving children).
6 See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALF. L. REv. 2353, 237677 n.105 (2007) (expressing the concern that "monetary power" not impede deliberation and political
participation in a representative democracy); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchyand Copyright
in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1879, 1886 (2000) ("[I]n an unregulated market,
wealth disparity skews public discourse in favor of speakers with the financial wherewithal to own a
mass media outlet and consumers likely to buy speech and the products that advertisers want to sell.");
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 589 (2004) (stating that free speech is a means to preserve social and
political equality against wealth disparities, but that because profitability drives media licensing fees, it
functionally limits accessibility to media outlets).
61 In Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart, the majority explicitly stated that the "Court has frequently
denied that First Amendment rights are absolute." 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); see also Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[A]lthough the rights of free speech
and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute."), overruled by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
62 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (identifying a 'definitional balance between the
First Amendment and the Copyright Act' that permits the freedom to communicate facts while
continuing to protect authors' original expressions (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985))).
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zoning ordinances, 63 indicate that not all manner of expressions are
covered by the First Amendment.
The function of speech in a democracy helps to reconcile the
seemingly absolute language of the First Amendment" with legitimate
restraints on self-assertion. Justice Louis Brandeis's seminal concurrence
to Whitney v. California outlined the function of the constitutional
protections of free expression to include the ability to think and speak
freely in order to discover and disseminate political truths. Speech is not,
however, only instrumental. It is also "an end in itself' that is essential for
The First
human beings to achieve their individual sense of purpose.
Amendment is not only a protection of the polity but of the human drive to
demonstrate a sense of self-identity and to preserve individual dignity.
Free discussion, Brandeis believed, facilitates social stability by allowing
persons to publically vent volatile disagreements rather than allowing them
to fester into unresolved hatreds. The sentiments Brandeis expressed in
his concurrence have become the accepted values of protecting free
speech.69 True threats fall outside these accepted bounds of self-assertion
because they are meant to menace someone with physical harm.70 To
63See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48, 54-55 (1986) (holding that
an adult theater zoning ordinance was content-neutral and only subject to intermediate scrutiny because
the law targeted the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments). Justice Brennan and
Justice Kennedy criticized Renton's "content-neutral" characterization in two separate concurrences.
City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
*' See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech. . . .").
65 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
" Brandeis explained that:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a
means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty.
Id.
67 In the words of Justice Marshall:
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the
human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral
part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expression is
to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual's worth
and dignity.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
6 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
69See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REv. 589,
606 (1996) ("At least since the famed concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California,
it has been well accepted that the answer to supposedly harmful speech is not governmental
suppression, but rather more speech." (footnote omitted)); Philippa Strum, Brandeis: The Public
Activist and Freedom of Speech, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 706 (2007) ("Brandeis's Whitney opinion and
embedded in it eventually became the cornerstone of American speech jurisprudence.").
the doctrine
70
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (suggesting that willfully threatening
the President may amount to unprotected expression); In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 647 (Cal.
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survive constitutional scrutiny, the regulation of cross burning, swastika
displays, or other intimidating images in a university must be mindful of
First Amendment values while also preserving individuals' right to live
undisturbed from the threat of immediate or future harm.
B. The Expression of Hate
The democratic purpose of First Amendment protection, which allows
for the expression of ideas to enrich dialogue, raises a challenge to the
formulation of university hate speech regulations. Existing jurisprudence,
nevertheless, indicates that intimidating threats do not fall under the core
speech protected by the Constitution.
Several mid-twentieth century cases identified some of the harmful
expressions that are unprotected by the First Amendment. In a case
decided during World War II, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,7 ' the Court
found that a Jehovah's Witness who verbally attacked a police marshal
could be prosecuted pursuant to an ordinance prohibiting public
incitement.72 The Court has long contrasted constitutional expression and
violent bombast because "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."73 The social
interest in "order and morality" outweighs any cathartic benefit a speaker
may derive.74 Just as fighting words are unprotected by the First
Amendment because they are unconnected to traditional speech values,
neither should hate speech receive First Amendment protection when it
aims to incite people to commit harmful acts against identifiable groups.
Not all hate speech seeks to incite others to act; sometimes it is simply a
true threat that might constitute an assault.76 But where hate speech
threatens a protected group and seeks to incite others to act against an
identifiable target, a university speech code can punish it. The free
exchange of ideas is not furthered through exhortations to attack, harm, or
Ct. App. 1994) (finding that "malicious" cross burning on another person's property constitutes a form
of "true threat").
" 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
72 Id at 569, 573-74.
7 Id. at 571-72. Recent cases have confirmed the continued vitality of the "fighting words"
doctrine. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
382-83 (1992).
74 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (concluding that the social interest in "order and morality"
outweighs the social benefits that 'fighting' words" may offer).
s See R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 401 (White, J., concurring) ("[A] ban on all fighting words or on a
subset of the fighting words category would restrict only the social evil of hate speech, without creating
the danger of driving viewpoints from the marketplace.").
7
6 See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of
Freedom ofExpression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1378 (1998) (finding that the burning of a cross "in
front of the home of an African-American family" is sufficient to constitute an assault "if family
members observe it and suffer imminent fear for their safety").
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discriminate against others.77 A judge determining whether a verbal attack
is dangerous enough to constitute an offense must consider the context in
which it was uttered. Even the content-based regulation of speech that is
drafted with enough generality not to discriminate against particular
viewpoints can be a permissible use of government power when "the evil
to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests."7
Fighting words are analogous to hate speech insofar as both are meant
In
to provoke violent reaction rather than to elicit discussion.
circumstances where fighting words are meant to intimidate others by
reference to historically intimidating symbols, like swastikas or burning
crosses, they enter the realm of hate speech. Neither form of expression
seeks to promote debate. Rather than being discursive, hate messages are
79
meant to be threatening or damaging to targeted individuals.
The enormous import of free speech renders it imperative to take
utmost care to prevent any regulation of hate speech to become an excuse
for the repression of heterodox ideas.80 Unconstitutional infringements
n See id. at 1318, 1378-79 (suggesting that hate speech, when directed against particular persons,
lacks sufficient value to justify the injuries and rights violations it causes, and therefore does not merit
First Amendment protection). But see John 0. McGinnis, The Once and FutureProperty-BasedVision
of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 49, 90 & n.167 (1996) (arguing that, under a propertybased theory of the First Amendment, many difficulties would arise in attempting to regulate hate
speech).
78See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (asserting that "it is not rare that a
content-based classification of speech has been accepted [as constitutional] because it may be
appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests"). Some opponents of hate speech codes claim that
the Supreme Court has "largely abandoned" the fighting words doctrine. ALAN CHARLES KORS &
HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON AMERICA'S

CAMPUSES 86 (1998). That claim, however, does not hold up against the fact that Supreme Court
Justices have regularly relied on Chaplinsky. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-11
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that, originally, the First Amendment did not protect student
speech in public schools); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740
(1996) (citing Chaplinsky for the proposition that Congress and states can "address the most serious
problems" through legislation); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (using Chaplinsky for
precedential value, but distinguishing it from the case at bar). For Courts of Appeals citations to
Chaplinsky, see, for example, IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009); DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 301, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); United States
v. Judd, 315 F. App'x 35,40 (10th Cir. 2008).
79
See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (stating that "above all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
soBy "heterodox" opinions, I mean those that are outside the mainstream and unpopular. District
of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (stating that the First Amendment protects "the
expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views"); Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that it can be
too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First
Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we
cherish."). First Amendment jurisprudence has developed to prevent the abuse of neutral-sounding
statutes to repress public debate. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 442 (1996) ("[T]he First
Amendment bans restrictions on speech arising from hostility, sympathy, or self-interest. The fact is
that courts cannot enforce this ban directly.").
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against unpopular views were common during and after the First World
War and throughout the Red Scare in the mid-1950s, when political
suppression of Communist or anarchist statements stifled public debate.
Hate speakers do not merely add an unpopular perspective into the
marketplace of ideas; if they did no more than that their views would be
protected. Their aim is to incite illegal conduct, to intimidate, or to harm
the reputation of a select group of the public.8 2 Justice Byron R. White's
concurrence in R.A.V v. City of St. Paul dismissed the notion that hate
speech is a legitimate form of political discourse: "Instead, it permits,
indeed invites, the continuation of expressive conduct that . . . is evil and

worthless in First Amendment terms ....
as a form of 'debate[]'

. . .

[C]haracterizing fighting words

legitimates hate speech as a form of public

discussion., 8 3
Not all expressions of hatred and intolerance are advocacy; therefore,
some expressions of apathy, disdain, or outright malevolence do not fit the
paradigm of administratively punishable hate speech. Where only the
private expression of racism is involved without any provable intent to
harm, it is beyond the purview of government regulation. Under these
circumstances, even the depiction of symbols associated with violence
cannot be prosecuted where they are displayed in some private location,
like a home, or even at a private hate rally. Brandenburg v. Ohio84
indicates that the First Amendment protects the liberty right of students
who unobtrusively display racially or ethnically hateful emblems or
insignia. That case involved the criminal conviction of a man under the
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism law for leading a Ku Klux Klan rally.s The
Klansmen and an invited journalist attended the meeting at which a cross
was burned. Because the journalist was invited, he never sensed any threat
81For a discussion of the regulation of expressive activities during this time period, see Dale
Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-DiscriminationLaw Afier Dale: A TripartiteApproach, 85
MINN. L. REv. 1515, 1520-25 (2001).
82 See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality ofAmerican ConstitutionalExceptionalism,
107 MIcH. L. REv. 391, 402 (2008) (distinguishing "Western" regulations on incitement hate speech
from U.S. laws); John C. Knechtle, Holocaust Denial and the Concept of Dignity in the European
Union, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 41, 46 (2008) (noting that "fighting words" and "true threats," among
other forms of speech, do not receive First Amendment protection); Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries
of Free Speech, 8 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 141, 159-60 (2005) [hereinafter Tsesis, Boundaries]
(alteration in original) (explaining that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires
signatory states to prevent '[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence').
8 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 402 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
* 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
85See id. at 444-45 (alterations in original) (prohibiting "'advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or
propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
industrial or political reform' and for 'voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage
of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism'
(quoting OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (1964))). At its core, the law prohibited the use of political advocacy to instigate
criminal conduct. Id. at 448-49.
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from the burning cross. At the event, armed persons made derogatory
statements about blacks and Jews. The only statement entered into the
record that could have been interpreted as incitement was couched in
qualifications that would have made it virtually impossible to prove
criminal intent: "The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than
does any other organization. We're not a revengent organization, but if our
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some
revengeance taken." 87 The Court held that under the circumstances, given
that the recorded speeches were abstract assertions rather than advocacy to
commit imminent violence, application of the Ohio statute would intrude
on First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly.88
The statute was also unconstitutional on its face since it punished mere
advocacy.89

The case remains relevant even though more recent jurisprudence has
qualified its central holding. 90 In Brandenburg, the Court indicated that
only under imminently dangerous circumstances does advocacy warrant
regulation to prevent speakers from inciting others to commit lawless
actions91

In examining the constitutionality of restrictions, the Court

determined that trial courts must review the context in which a statement
was made to determine whether it is likely to instigate socially or
individually harmful consequences.92 In criminal trials, the prosecution
must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the speaker actually
intended to achieve the advocated criminal act.93
The Brandenburgstandard prevents the punishment of empty or even
" Id. at 445-46. On the film, Brandenburg appeared in Klan regalia speaking of vengeance and
advocating sending blacks to Africa and Jews to Israel. WAYNE OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF
MEDIA LAW 56 (2007).
87
Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 446.
8
Id. at 448-49.
SId.at 449.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 98 and 130.
91See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (espousing the principle that "the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
92See Frederick Schauer, Is It Better To Be Safe than Sorry?: FreeSpeech and the Precautionary
Principle, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 301, 307 (2009) ("[A]s new events cause us to revise our previous
estimates, it should come as little surprise that these new events should cause us to re-examine ... the
doctrines that have emanated out of earlier and possibly outdated empirical estimates."). In a recent
dissent, Justice Breyer recognized the relevance of contextualized analysis of speech in cases involving
public safety. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851-52 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93 The plurality in Virginia v. Black set out the parameters of a "true threats" statute that prohibits
intentional intimidation: "'True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). In a related subject
on hate speech, Jeannine Bell has provided a discussion of state statutes prohibiting the intimidating
display of nooses. Jeannine Bell, The Hangman's Noose and the Lynch Mob: Hate Speech and the
JenaSix, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329,351-52 (2009).
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emotionally charged threats. It aims to prevent the government from
persecuting anyone who jokingly, in the heat of the moment, or out of
simmering anger, urges unlawful conduct. Professor Thomas Healy's
recent claim that criminal advocacy is part of the search for truth, selfgovernment, or self-fulfillment 4 does not get at the core of the decision's
holding. In fact, criminal advocacy coupled with intent to bring about the
95 The Klan
crime is unlike the Ku Klux Klan scenario of Brandenburg.
gathering was at a private location with only one person, the invited
journalist, not a participant of the rally. Unlike Frohwerk, Debs, and
Schenck, the inflammatory language in Brandenburgwas not directed to a
public audience. As I will explain below, the Court has found that
expression of hate only becomes criminal when it is advocacy calculated to
achieve criminal conduct.
General racist statements at public university campuses are probably
protected forms of expression, but when a person stands up in a classroom
or in the college commons area and advocates the commission of specific
criminal conduct, his statements are no longer immune from campus
regulation and criminal prosecution.9 6 No educational purpose is served by
criminal incitement on campus that incorporates symbols historically
linked to violence, such as swastikas and burning crosses. 97
As comprehensive as the Brandenburg imminence standard sounds,
there are circumstances where the state can prohibit hate speech that is
Most important, in
neither imminently harmful nor instigative.
Beauharnaisv. Illinois,98 the Court determined that states and cities may
prohibit group defamation, even when it does not pose an imminent threat
of harm.99 Several scholars and judges have wrongly claimed that group
defamation is no longer constitutional after New York Times Co. v.
Sullivano00 and R.A. V,o but their arguments are not only conjectural but

9 Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 655, 683-89
(2009).
9 See Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1293, 1309 (2007) (stating
that "like Brandenburg,Schenck demanded that courts scrutinize only the likelihood that speech would
trigger some harm or danger, not the enormity or significance of the threat").
96Recent circuit court decisions indicate that common areas at universities are designated public
fora. E.g., Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 97840 (8th Cir. 2006); ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438,
444 (4th Cir. 2005).
9 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) ("[Wlhere state-operated educational institutions
are involved, this Court has long recognized 'the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools."' (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969))).
9 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
9 See id. at 266 ("Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected
speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase
'clear and present danger.').
'" 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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dismissive of recent Supreme Court cases that make clear that Beauharnais
remains valid precedent.
In Beauharnais,the Court upheld the constitutionality of a group libel
statute that rendered it actionable to "portray[] depravity, criminality . .. or
lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed, or religion"
and to expose those citizens to "contempt, derision, or obloquy."' 02 The
majority found that, given Illinois's history of racial friction, its legislature
could enact legislation to punish the dissemination of demeaning messages,
such as those opposed to neighborhood integration, because those
messages threatened "the peace and well-being of the State." 03 The
opinion conceived of government playing a role in establishing a standard
of decency designed to prevent intergroup friction.
Of the four justices who dissented in Beauharnais, only one, Justice
Hugo Black, espoused an absolutist view of the First Amendment.1"4
While the other three dissenters agreed that the conviction should be
overturned, they nonetheless agreed with the majority that, under some
circumstances, group defamation could be an actionable offense.0 s Justice
Stanley Reed claimed that group defamation statutes could only be
constitutional if they required proof of criminal incitements.' 06 Justice
William 0. Douglas's dissent found the statute to be vague but recognized
the potential dangers of hate speech:
Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could
be which was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to
101

See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 978 (2d

ed. 2002) (concluding that the statute in Beauharnais "almost certainly would be declared
unconstitutional today based on vagueness and overbreadth grounds"); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 185-86 (1995) (stating that commentators believe

that broadly-defined bans on hate speech are no longer valid); Cedric Merlin Powell, The Mythological
Marketplace of Ideas: R.A.V., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 34 (1995)
(arguing that, after Sullivan, Beauharnais "is no longer persuasive authority"); Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 517-18 (noting that
"[tihe group defamation concept ... has been thoroughly discredited by others"); Jonathan D. Varat,
Deception and the FirstAmendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53
UCLA L. REv. 1107, 1116-17 n.29 (2006) (observing that numerous lower courts and commentators
have concluded that Beauharnaisis no longer good law). Sunstein argues that the First Amendment
protects speech because it is vital to self-governance in a "deliberative democracy," in which "new
information and perspectives influence social judgments about possible courses of action," and believes
some forms of hate speech do not contribute to "social deliberation." SUNSTEIN, supra, at 18-19, 198.
1
02Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 251, 266-67 (quoting 38 ILL. REv. STAT. § 471 (1949)).
o3 Id. at 252, 258-59. This law against the dissemination of class and group prejudices had a
long history before the Court's Beauharnais opinion, appearing as early as 1919 in a collection of
Illinois statutes. 2 ANNOTATED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 1497 (Oliver A. Harker ed.,
1919).
' Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 274-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
1osId at 283-84 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 284-85, 287 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 299-302
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
' See id. at 279, 283 (Reed, J., dissenting) (arguing that free speech rights may be abridged
"when speech becomes an incitement to crime," but that words giving rise to speech limitations "[need
to] be reasonably well defined").
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contempt, derision, and obloquy. I would be willing to
concede that such conduct directed at a race or group in this
country could be made an indictable offense.' 0 7
Finally, Justice Robert Jackson agreed that the state could pass group
libel laws, but dissented because the trial judge did not give Defendant
Beauharnais, the president of a racist Chicago organization, an adequate
opportunity to proffer his defense.'0o
Beauharnaismight offer a model for formulating one type of campus
hate speech code,'09 but several authors challenge its precedential value.
Dean Rodney Smolla, for instance, states that "Beauharnais is flatly
inconsistent with modern First Amendment doctrines restraining contentbased and view-point based discrimination.""o Smolla explains this view
by analogy to other free speech jurisprudence. In this, he provides
reasoning that similarly minded authors do not. For instance, Professor
Eugene Volokh is content to claim that "Beauharnais is now widely
regarded as no longer being good law,""' but he does not provide any
argument for his opinion. Volokh further claims that any university group
libel prohibition would be unconstitutional.'1 2 Smolla, on the other hand,
expostulates on the doctrine from other areas of free speech
jurisprudence.1 3 He claims that just as the Court does not countenance
restrictions on lewd or profane speech, neither does it approve of criminal
group libel statutes.1 4 This analogy is incongruous because lewd and
107Id. at 284

(Douglas, J., dissenting).
'osId. at 299-301 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
1 See, e.g., Rhonda G. Hartman, Revitalizing Group Defamation as a Remedy for Hate Speech
on Campus, 71 OR. L. REv. 855, 884-85 (1992) ("Beauharnaisunderscores the importance that the
First Amendment value accorded defamation by the Court has to the success of university proscription
of group defamatory hate speech. Because group defamation is not fully protected speech, a court
would probably find a reasonable university determination of harm sufficient to justify even an
absolute prohibition of hateful, vilifying expression."); Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free
Speech: Abusing the FirstAmendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 11, 35 (1985) ("Beauharnais...
strengthens the argument that the Court would approve a properly drawn and construed statute or
judicial ruling proscribing racial defamation of a group."); James R. Bussian, Comment, Anatomy of
the Campus Speech Code: An Examination of Prevailing Regulations, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 153, 179
(1995) ("If a university wants to convey its commitment to having an environment free of
discrimination to its students, a speech code formulated after the language in the group defamation
statute in Beauharnais is one possible solution whose utility has yet to be realized." (footnote
omitted)).
110Rodney A. Smolla, Words "Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury": The Evolving
Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317,
351-52 (2009).
1" Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the ConstitutionalTension Method, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 223, 238 n.87 (1996). Volokh is similarly dismissive of the case in an earlier work. See
Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791,
1819-20 n.127 (1992).
112 Volokh, supranote 111, at 420.
"'1Rodney A. Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 215-16 (1990).
" Id. at 208.
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profane language is neither related to the incitement of violence nor to
group libel. Smolla also asserts that "Beauharnaiscannot survive side by
side with cases such as Brandenburg.""' This latter statement overlooks
post-Brandenburgjurisprudence.
A weakness in this line of counter-arguments is that while proclaiming
allegiance to Supreme Court jurisprudence, Smolla and Volokh avoid key
cases that challenge their perspective. Particularly glaring is the reliance
on a circuit court case, Collin v. Smith," 6 in an effort to demonstrate that
"subsequent developments in libel and political speech jurisprudence have
implicitly overruled Beauharnais."" Relying on an appellate court case
in order to demonstrate the invalidity of Beauharnais is analytically
unsound. In Collin, the Seventh Circuit stated that cases like Brandenburg
"implicitly" raised a question as to whether "Beauharnais would pass
constitutional muster today."" 8 But the court of appeals never assumed
away the binding precedent; instead, it found that the law in question did
not survive the Beauharnais analysis." 9 The Collin court's rhetorical
statement used implicit logic, but its explicit statements about Supreme
Court precedent lead to the opposite conclusion. After the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Collin, Justice Blackmun took the unusual step of
publishing a statement on behalf of himself and Justice White. Blackmun
did so to indicate his sense that "the Seventh Circuit's decision is in some
tension with Beauharnais. That case has not been overruled or formally
limited in any way." 2 0 While this assertion is not part of a binding
opinion, it has been borne out by subsequent majority opinions, the most
recent one issued in 2010, demonstrating that the holding in Beauharnais
has neither been overturned nor even questioned.121
"5 Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the FirstAmendment: An Analysis of Hustler v.
Falwell, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 423, 444 (1988).
"' 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
" Steven G. Gey, What If Wisconsin v. Mitchell Had Involved Martin Luther King, Jr.? The
ConstitutionalFlaws ofHate Crime Enhancement Statutes, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1014, 1055 (1997);
see also Lili Levi, Reporting the Official Truth: The Revival ofthe FCC's News Distortion Policy, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1084 & n.286 (2000) (referring to Collin as an example of the court declining to
apply Beauharnaisto a Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois); Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters:
Why "Immoral" and "Scandalous" Trademarks Should Be FederallyRegistrable,6 FED. CIR. B.J. 191,
202-03 (1996) (describing Collin which "considered Beauharnaisto be invalid, or at the least limited
to situations where a breach of the peace is imminent"). Justice Richard Posner recently reaffirmed a
commitment to his own vision of group defamation, ignoring the body of Supreme Court precedents
that reaffirm its constitutionality. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d
668, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[Tlhough Beauharnaisv. Illinois has never been overruled, no one thinks the
First Amendment would today be interpreted to allow group defamation to be prohibited." (citation
omitted)).
"l Collin, 578 F.2d at 1204.

Id. at 1204-05.
Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) ("'From 1791 to the
present' . . . the First Amendment has 'permitted restrictions upon the content of the speech in a few
limited areas,' and has never 'include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.' These
120
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Another common error in the academic literature is to rely on a second
Seventh Circuit case, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,12 2 to claim, in
the sternly dramatic words of one author, that "[t]he doctrinal tides that
have swept libel in general into the First Amendment ocean have left
Beauharnais ... high and dry."1 23 In Hudnut, the appellate court in fact
believed it was following precedent, claiming "that cases such as New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan [have] so washed away the foundations of
e
Beauharnais that it [can no longer] be considered authoritative."24
found
but
incorrect,
be
might
presumption
its
that
admitted
court
circuit
that the case did not support the challenged ordinance irrespective of
Beauharnais'sstatus.12 5
The Seventh Circuit was mistaken in its understanding of the judicial
trend. Sullivan established the requirement that any public figure suing in
defamation prove that the offensive false statement was uttered with actual
malice. 12 6 Consequently, its effect on Beauharnaisextends only to cases
where group libels are directed against public personalities, in which case
the actual malice standard applies. But Sullivan had no effect on private
group defamation cases. The Supreme Court made this point in a 1982
case, New York v. Ferber, stating that, except in special cases related to
public officials, Beauharnais continues to be the controlling precedent on
Consequently, misethnic group
the publication of group libels.127
officials can be prohibited when
public
against
directed
that
is
defamation
stated maliciously, despite the actual knowledge of the statement's
falsehood and with the reckless disregard for its truth value.12 8 Yet, staying
true to Sullivan's restraints, it is still constitutional for the state to place
'historic and traditional categories' . . . includ[e] obscenity [and] defamation . . . ."); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) ("We have recognized that 'the freedom of speech' referred to by
the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations."); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984) ("[T]here are categories of
communication and certain special utterances to which the majestic protection of the First Amendment
does not extend .... Libelous speech has been held to constitute one such category.").
122 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), af'd, Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
123 Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap: Why
ProliferatingNew Communications Technologies Make It ParticularlyUrgentfor the Supreme Court
to Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words, and
Group Libel Within the FirstAmendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883, 950 (1996).
124

Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 331-32 n.3.

125ld

126
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) ("The constitutional guarantees
require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
).
malice' ....
127 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (citing Sullivan and Beauharnais for the
proposition that, "[1]eaving aside the special considerations when public officials are the target, a
libelous publication is not protected by the Constitution").
128 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (concluding that a prohibition on the ability of a public
official to recover damages for defamation does not include instances where a speaker makes a
defamatory statement falsely or "with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"); see also
TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 2 (defining "misethnicity").
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prohibitions on expressions which "portray[] 'depravity, criminality ... or
lack of virtue' of 'a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed, or religion'"
1 29
and make that group subject to 'contempt, derision, or obloquy."'
Group defamation made against persons who are not public officials would
fall under the standard set forth in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,130 requiring
only proof of the defamer's negligence to prevail.
Counter-intuitively, the most convincing indication of Beauharnais's
vitality comes from the very Supreme Court decision that for years had
been the mainstay of opponents to university hate speech codes, R.A. V v.
City of St. Paul.132 The case explicitly enumerated several types of
expressions, including group defamation, that are unprotected by the First

Amendment.133
For a decade, R.A. V hindered universities determined to punish the
expression of hatred against racial, religious, ethnic, gender, national, or
sexual orientation groups. The R.A. V case arose when some juveniles set
fire to a cross on a black family's lawn.134 The youths were charged under
a St. Paul ordinance which made it a misdemeanor to display, in public or
private places, symbols-like Nazi swastikas and burning crosses-which
are known to 'arouse anger, alarm or resentment . .. on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender. "'35 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia held that the ordinance resulted in unconstitutional "content
discrimination."l 36 The statute was flawed, he explained, because rather
than punishing the use of all fighting words the law singled out hate
speech.13 7 Scalia acknowledged that St. Paul had a compelling interest in
protecting the human rights of the "members of groups that have
historically been subjected to discrimination."138 To accomplish that end,
however, the city could enact a blanket prohibition on hostile
expressions.13 9
Justice White sharply disagreed with the majority, arguing that it
deviated from precedents that had long allowed for content-based
129Beauhamais

v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 270-71 (1952) (quoting 38 ILL. REV. STAT.

§ 471

(1949)).
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
' Id. at 350.
13' 505 U.S. 377, 402
(1992).
13 Id. at 383 (mentioning defamation as an area in which First Amendment safeguards
are at a
minimum). The Court explicitly stated that "[e]ven the prohibition against content discrimination . . . is
not absolute." Id. at 387.
34
1 Id.at 379.
1s Id at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE §
292.02 (1990)).
1 Id at 387 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
13 See id. at 391 (concluding that the ordinance applied only to "'fighting words' that insult, or
provoke violence, 'on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender"').
3
' 1 d at 395.
"9 See id at 395-96 ("The dispositive question . . . is whether content discrimination is
reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling interests; it plainly is not. An ordinance not
limited to the favored topics, for example, would have precisely the same beneficial effect.").
13
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regulation of low-level speech.140 Using language reminiscent of the
rationale behind the fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky, White pointed
out that nothing is wrong with prohibiting the use of a subset of speech that
is "by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection."' 4 1
In his estimation, the majority illegitimately substituted its judgment for
the city's conclusion that disparagements "based on race, color, creed,
religion, [and] gender" pose "more pressing public concerns than the
harms caused by other fighting words." 4 2 In his most poignant comments,
White blamed the majority for elevating worthless fighting words to the
level of "debate."l 43
White's concurrence, therefore, recognized the constitutionality of hate
speech regulations, but he joined the court's judgment because the specific
ordinance in the case covered protected forms of speech.'" St. Paul had
sought to prevent the use of insults to cause offense or resentment.14 In a
separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice White that the
scope of the statute was overbroad.146 He further believed there to be "no
First Amendment values that are compromised by a law that prohibits
hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by burning crosses on
their lawns." 4 7
In a third concurrence, Justice Stevens poked holes in the majority's
reasoning. He pointed to several constitutional limits on utterances. For
example, "a city can prohibit political advertisements in its buses while
allowing other advertisements." 4 8 Like White and Blackmun, he found
the majority's assertion that all content-based regulations are
unconstitutional to be disingenuous and precedentially unsound.14 9 Just as
the state can differentiate between various forms of commercial speech, so
too can it choose to prohibit some but not all types of fighting words. 50 In
formulating legislative policy, lawmakers can evaluate the potential social
harms that are likely to result from varying forms of fighting words.'
Any hope that R.A. V was an absolute ban against any regulation of
' Id at 401 (White, J., concurring).
141 id
42

Id. at 407.

14

Id at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted).

'" Id at 411, 413.
45

Id at 414.

1

4

Id at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

17id.
48 Id

at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id at 419.
"s See id at 434 ("[E]ven if the St. Paul ordinance did regulate fighting words based on its
subject matter, such a regulation would ... be constitutional. ... [S]ubject-matter-based regulations on
commercial speech are widespread and largely unproblematic.").
"' See Shannon Gilreath, "Tell Your Faggot FriendHe Owes Me $500 for My Broken Hand":
Thoughts on a Substantive Equality Theory ofFreeSpeech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 557, 574 (2009)
(discussing the importance of the First Amendment theory of assessing the social context of speech to
determine when words become dehumanizing, degrading, and subjugating actions).
4
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15 2

hate speech was short-lived.
While it has not been overtly overruled, its
impact has been ameliorated. Black is the most recent Supreme Court case
to shed light on the allowable elements of college hate speech codes. The
case arose from the prosecution of individuals for cross burning153 pursuant
to a more narrowly drafted statute than the one struck down in R.A. V
Virginia's law made it
unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause
to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or
other public place. Any person who shall violate any
provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of

persons.154
A majority of justices agreed that the state did not violate the First
Amendment by punishing intentionally intimidating displays of burning
crosses.' 55 Mimicking the language in Chaplinsky, the Court found that
such conduct was of "'such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality."' 5 6 The statute did not run afoul of the
prohibition against content discrimination because it prohibited all manner
of cross burning, irrespective of whether it sought to intimidate others on
the basis of their race, religion, or other characteristics.' 57 The Court
explained that Virginia could selectively punish cross burnings, even
though it did not criminalize all other forms of virulent intimidation, "in
light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of
impending violence." 5 1
An important distinction between the St. Paul ordinance and the
Virginia statute was that the latter prohibited the entire category of
threatening cross burnings, not just those that expressed hatred toward a
particular group. The city ordinance struck down by the R.A. V Court, on
the other hand, only prohibited cross burnings meant to "arouse[] anger,
152 For a discussion on R.A. V.'s nearly absolutist perspective on speech,
see Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 602
(2005); Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
953, 973 (2004); Friedrich Ktlbler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects ofa
Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 335, 363-64 (1998); Hon. John Paul Stevens, The
Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1310 (1993).
15 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003).
1 Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996)).
" Id. at 347.
16 Id. at 358-59 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992)).
"1Id. at 362-63.
1s Id. at 363.
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alarm or resentment in others ... on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender."159 A narrow reading of Black would require campus hate
speech codes to be as open-ended as the Virginia statue. A broader reading
of Black, however, is that the underlying problem of the Minnesota
ordinance was that it prohibited words that merely aroused an emotive
response rather than intimidated persons. The broader reading would
indicate that a university could pass a speech code punishing cross
burnings that intimidate others because of their racial-, social-, gender-,
political-, or sexual orientation-group statuses. The Black decision is
unclear about whether both types of regulations, or only the open-ended
one, would pass constitutional muster.
What is clear is that only intentionally symbolic intimidation may be
regulated, but the Court in Black did not agree on whether the fact-finder
can infer the scienter element or if the prosecutor must prove it-only a
plurality of the Court found the statute's prima facie evidence presumption
to be unconstitutional.16 0 The group of four justices who comprised the
plurality argued that without requiring prosecutors to prove a defendant's
state of mind, juries would lack context to determine "whether a particular
cross burning is intended to intimidate."l 6 1
Several states currently have cross burning and harassment laws.162
' R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60
See Black, 538 U.S. at 368 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I write
separately ... to explain why I believe there is no justification for the plurality's apparent decision to
invalidate [the prima facie evidence] provision on its face.").
161Id. at 367 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Stevens,
and
Breyer made up the plurality, holding that the prima facie element of the Virginia statute was
unconstitutional. Id. Justice Scalia, who had joined those four in other parts of the opinion, argued that
the prima facie presumption was a legitimate rebuttable presumption. Id. at 368-69 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas joined Scalia on this point. But Thomas also
wrote a separate dissent, arguing that cross burning was by definition a violent form of intimidation.
See id at 388-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that "whatever expressive value cross burning has,
the legislature simply wrote it out by banning only intimidating conduct undertaken by a particular
means" and that "the association between acts of intimidating cross burning and violence is well
documented in recent American history"). Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment in part and joined
by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, never reached the prima facie issue, writing instead against the
constitutionality of the entire statute: "In my view, severance of the prima facie evidence provision now
could not eliminate the unconstitutionality of the whole statute at the time of the respondents' conduct."
Id. at 387 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1707 (2010) (prohibiting cross burning); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-7902(b) (2004) (making the "placing of any word or symbol commonly associated with
racial, religious or ethnic terrorism on the property of another person [unlawful] without his or her
permission"); 720 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.6 (West 2010) (specifying the elements of cross
burning); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.095 (West 2010) (defining the crime of cross burning); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-221 (2009) (establishing the crime of "malicious intimidation or harassment" relating to
civil or human rights); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19B-2 (2006) (defining one type of hate crime as
defacement by burning crosses and "the placing of any word or symbol commonly associated with
racial, religious, or ethnic terrorism on the property of another person without that person's
permission"); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.36.080(2) (West 2009) (prohibiting acts like burning
crosses and defacing property with a swastika), amended on other grounds, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws
961-62.
'
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The new doctrine on hate speech provides state universities clear
parameters for developing hate speech policies that punish the depiction of
hateful symbolic speech with a culpable frame of mind. International
protocols on racist and xenophobic speech provide further reason to
believe that university hate speech codes do not violate the underlying
principles of democratic free speech.
IV. INTERNATIONAL POLICY

University administrators wishing to deter hate speech on their
campuses will need to review Supreme Court precedents, especially
Chaplinsky, R.A. V., and Black, to identify how to achieve the goal while
respecting speakers' First Amendment rights. International norms, while
not binding on American courts, provide advisory insight for colleges
wishing to balance the dignity rights of those targeted by hate speech and
the liberty rights of speakers.' 6 3 There are recent signs of some Supreme
Court justices' willingness to consider international legal standards. In
Lawrence v. Texas, a case recognizing the constitutional value of
consensual, adult sexual intimacy,'" and Roper v. Simmons, 65 invalidating
the death penalty in cases involving juvenile offenders,' 6 6 the majority of
the Court demonstrated an openness to international norms. 67
Throughout the world, democracies recognize that on campuses and at
other public places hate speech can be suppressed because it poses a social
threat and does not constitute a form of legitimate political debate. The
general trend is to balance the rights of speakers against the interests of
persons who are the targets of hateful statements.'16 In this area of law,
countries that bar the use of racial and ethnic incitement tend to follow
163Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas have been the most opposed to the
incorporation of international precedents into American constitutional interpretation. For example, see
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008), in which Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court,
asserted that "not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law
enforceable in United States courts"; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), in which Justice Scalia deemed the majority's "discussion of these foreign views" to be
"meaningless dicta"; and Fosterv. Florida,537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring), in
which Justice Thomas stated that "jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on
Americans."
'" See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (referring to a decision of the European Court of Human
Rights on consensual homosexual conduct).
65 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
6

Id. at 578.

id.at 575-78 (detailing international norms against juvenile capital punishment).
Defamation cases clearly balance the value of speech against individuals' right to their good
reputation. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (barring public
officials' recovery of damages for defamatory falsehoods absent proof that the speaker made the
statement with "actual malice"); cf Gentile v. State Bar ofNev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (setting a
balancing standard in right-to-attorney cases); William Funk, Intimidation and the Internet, 110 PENN
ST. L. REV. 579, 593 (2006) ("First Amendment doctrine, however, generally avoids applying . . .
implicit balancing to new cases.").
67 See, e.g.,
6
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international standards of civility. Typically, the balance is struck more in
favor of the victims' rights, in contrast to the United States' inclination
towards the interests of speakers.
The international trend began in the aftermath of World War II, when
the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It obligates
signatory states to punish the "[d]irect and public incitement to commit
genocide."' 6 9 Not satisfied with the rather limited scope of the Genocide
Convention, multiple members of the United Nations broadened the
coverage through the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. The latter convention requires signatories to punish
"all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [and]
incitement to racial discrimination." 7 0 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is yet another relevant international agreement.
It requires that "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence" be
"prohibited by law." 7 '
In response to the virtual ubiquity of the Internet,172 the most recent
expansion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been the
Council of Europe's Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime,
Concerning the Criminalization of Racist and Xenophobic Acts Committed
Through the Operation of Computer Systems. 7 3 This convention requires
signatory countries to pass laws prohibiting the manipulation of electronic
transmission devices to intentionally threaten or insult people who "(i) ...
belong to a group, distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or
ethnic origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext for any of these
factors, or (ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of these

169Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, openedfor signature
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
1o International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
openedfor

signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S 195, 220 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
1' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
I.C.C.P.R. art. 20, 2 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
172See Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 817, 818 (2001) [hereinafter Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace] (describing the globalized
reach and influence of the Internet with respect to communications, knowledge, employment
opportunities, and so on).
7' For additional details about the treaty, see Knechtle, supra note 82, at 48-49; Yulia A.
Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison of Regulations in the United
States and Germany, 12 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 265-66 (2003). U. N. Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon issued a statement in 2009 asking the Internet industry to "help ensure that hate speech does
not proliferate online." Press Release, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., Secretary-General, at Seminar on
Cyberhate, Spells out Steps Taken To Protect Children from "Digital Demonization," Make
Cyperspace Safer for Youth (June 16, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2009/sgsml2319.doc.
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characteristics."," A glaring weakness of these four protocols is that none
of them include sexual orientation as a protected class.
These international norms have been incorporated into laws and mores
of numerous democratic countries. Part II of this Article described hate
speech attacks recently occurring at American universities; internationally,
universities face similar concerns about the dissemination of hate speech.
Five Canadian university presidents and vice presidents have recently
networked to develop a policy against expressing antisemitic sentiments
cloaked under the guise of anti-Zionism.175 During a recent meeting of the
Canadian Political Science Association, some members of the audience
accused a professor of using hate speech against the nation's aboriginal
tribes, raising the question of whether college administrators could resolve

the dispute.176
The United Kingdom has witnessed a rise in campus antisemitic
speech. 7 7 British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a directive requiring
"universities to stop anti-Jewish ideology from taking root on
campuses."l7 8 So much complacency had been shown, that the English
'" Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts
of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, openedfor signatureNov.
23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 189.
' Toronto Universities Confer with FSWC to Help Protect Jewish Students in Response to HateFilled Week, MARKETWIRE (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/TorontoUniversities-Confer-With-FSWC-Help-Protect-Jewish-Students-Response-Hate-Filled-956582.htm;
see also Frances Kraft, Jewish Students Kept Tabs on Anti-Israel Event, CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS, Feb.
10, 2005, at 45 (concerning a university investigation of a hate speech complaint); Fred M. Hoppe,
Letter to the Editor, No More Hate Speech, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Hamilton, Ont.), Mar. 15, 2008,
available at http://www.thespec.com/opinion/letters/article/168967 (stressing the need to ban hate
speech from the McMaster University campus).
76 Alexandra Shimo, Tough Critique orHate Speech?, MACLEAN'S, Mar. 2, 2009, at 42.
' Adam Pike, UK Jewish Students Get Some Out-of-Class Lessons, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 18,
2009, available at http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=136399. One of the most prominent
facets of recent British antisemitic activities has been the effort to boycott Israeli academics. The
University and College Union, a trade union of universities, formally invited a person whom the South
Africa Human Rights Commission had convicted for using "anti-Zionism to excuse, apologize for, and
ultimately align with antisemitic agitators." David Schraub, South Africa Conveys a Message Back to
Bongani Masuku, MODERATE VOICE (Dec. 6, 2009), http://themoderatevoice.com/55315/south-africaconveys-a-message-back-to-bongani-masuku. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to detonate
a bomb on an airplane headed to the United States, had been president of the University College of
London's Islamic Society. He is reported to have been deeply influenced by a radical Islamic cleric,
Anwar al-Awlaki, who gave a series of speeches at British universities. Patrick Sawer & David Barrett,
Detroit Bomber's Mentor Continues to Influence British Mosques and Universities, TELEGRAPH
(U.K.), Jan 2, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-theuk/6924653/Detroit-bombers-mentor-continues-to-influence-British-mosques-and-universities.html.
17 Denis MacShane, The New Anti-Semitism, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2007, at A17. Prosecutors
are empowered to bring causes of action "against Islamic extremists for speeches on student campuses"
under British Public Order Act 1986. Colin Brown, Warning over Islamic Extremists Operating in
Universities, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 28, 2007, at 6. A recent parliamentary report from the
House of Commons "highlighted attacks on undergraduates, a lack of respect by lecturers and tutors for
the needs of observant Jewish students and a growing tolerance of extreme language against Israel
during student debates on the Middle East." Isabel Oakeshott & Chris Gourlay, Anti-Semitism Rules
Come in at Universities, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 25, 2007, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/articlel563917.ece.
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government decided to "warn vice-chancellors they must not ignore
antiJewish [sic] activity on campuses and must prevent prejudiced
lecturers, guest speakers and extremist political organisations [from]
stirring up hatred against Israel."l 7 9 Marking a similar trend, the German
government accused a group with a substantial Muslim membership in
German universities of "propagating antisemitism and urging violence
against Jews." 80 The German government has been particularly leery of
this antisocial form of student behavior because of its own perilous history
with antisemitic and anti-democratic student organizations,' 8' and because
antisemitism
Germany pursues a policy meant to prevent the acceptance of
82
in universities as it is 'throughout the Arab Middle East."'l
The Canadian Ministry of the Attorney General can rely on several
Canadian laws prohibiting hate speech. The Canadian Supreme Court has
distinguished hate speech from protected speech. It has articulated the
purpose of constitutional protections for speech to be the protection of core
values of "(1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting selffulfilment [sic] of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and
ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political
process is open to all persons."' 83 The Supreme Court of Canada has
determined that hate speech is incompatible with these values.'84 While
free speech is a quintessentially fundamental right, its centrality for
individual self-governance is compatible with "reasonable limits
prescribed by law" as long as they are necessary for maintaining "a free

179Oakeshott & Gourlay, supra note 178.
1soRichard Bernstein, German Police Raid an Islamic Militant Group, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2003, at A9; see also Peter Finn, Germany Bans Islamic Group; Recruitment of Youths Worried
Officials, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2003, at A14 (reporting that the German government banned an
Islamic group "accused of spreading violent antisemitism on [German] university campuses and
establishing contacts with neo-Nazis").
181RICHARD J. EVANS, THE COMING OF THE THIRD REICH 426-31 (2003) [hereinafter EVANS,
THIRD REICH]. Antisemitism also spilled into university organizations, influencing the attitudes of
future leaders. The Union of German Students enjoyed large-scale support among students and
provided a forum for spreading racism to budding intellectuals and teachers. NANCY THORNDIKE
GREENSPAN, THE END OF THE CERTAIN WORLD: THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF MAX BORN 165 (2005);
Konrad H. Jarausch, Keynote Address: The Expulsion of Jewish Professors and Students from the
University of Berlin During the Third Reich, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: THE EXCLUSION AND
INCLUSION OF MINORITIES IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 9, 16 (Larry Eugene Jones ed.,
2001); Herman Jacobsohn, Effects of the War on Jews, REFORM ADvOc., July 30, 1921, at 760, 761.
One of the students' often-repeated complaints was that Jews enrolled in secondary schools and
universities at a higher rate than their proportion to the population, increasing competition in the job
market. JACOB KATZ, FROM PREJUDICE TO DESTRUCTION: ANTI-SEMITISM, 1700-1933, at 263 (1980).
182David G. Dalin, Hitler's Mufti, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept. 2005, at 14, 14; see also Ernest
Mabuza, Malema's Hate Speech Case Postponed, Bus. DAY (S. Afr.), June 6, 2009 ("In a country[,
South Africa,] that records some of the highest figures for sexual violence in the world, it is particularly
irresponsible for a political leader to be reinforcing both silence as well as attitudes that tolerate and
condone acts of sexual violence . . . .").
183Sierra Club of Can. v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, para. 75 (Can.).
18R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 699 (Can.).
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and democratic society."185
Canada's expositive definition of "hate speech" is pertinent even
though it is broader than the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Black.
Canada is openly willing to examine whether a hateful statement against an
identifiable group is harmful to a pluralistic society, while the United
States is only willing to place limitations on speech that intentionally
incites harmful conduct.186
In a case dealing with telephonically
transmitted hate speech, the Canadian Supreme Court explained the
importance of limiting speech that vilifies individuals. 87 The explanation
is pertinent to universities identifying unacceptable speech in a multiethnic
campus setting:
[M]essages of hate propaganda undermine the dignity and
self-worth of target group members and, more generally,
contribute to disharmonious relations among various racial,
cultural and religious groups, as a result eroding the tolerance
and open-mindedness that must flourish in a multicultural
society which is committed to the idea of equality. 88
While barring verbal attacks against individual dignity will not survive
the Black test, Canadian jurisprudence is compatible with U.S. defamation
case law. A foremost purpose of group and individual defamation law is
the protection of an individual's or a group's public reputation.'89 The
U.S. Supreme Court considers an "individual's right to the protection of
his own good name" to be grounded in 'our basic concept of the essential
..
sCanadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, § 1, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
'86See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362-63 (2003) (suggesting that the federal and state
governments may ban "'threats of violence"' (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388
(1992))); Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 751 ("The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate propaganda
therefore have a severely negative impact on the individual's sense of self-worth and acceptance. This
impact may cause target group members to take drastic measures in reaction, perhaps avoiding
activities which bring them into contact with non-group members or adopting attitudes and postures
directed towards blending in with the majority. Such consequences bear heavily in a nation that prides
itself on tolerance and the fostering of human dignity through, among other things, respect for the many
racial, religious and cultural groups in our society.").
187Canada (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (Can.).
' Id. at 922.
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 cmts. a-b (1979) (differentiating the types of
damage to reputation allowing the target to recover without showing any other damages from others
that do not allow for recovery without additional economic or pecuniary losses on the forms of
defamation that result in reputational harms); David A. Elder, Small Town Police Forces, Other
GovernmentalEntities and the Misapplication of the FirstAmendment to the Small Group Defamation
Theory-A Plea for Fundamental Fairnessfor Mayberry, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 881, 933 (2004)
(stating that the Supreme Court finds equally compelling the need to provide redress for reputational
harms and the need to protect freedom of expression); Thomas David Jones, Human Rights: Freedom
of Expression and Group Defamation Under British, Canadian, Indian, Nigerian and United States
Law-A Comparative Analysis, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 427, 586 (1995) (noting that when
defamation harms a group's reputation and social esteem, it often leads to aggressive conduct against
that group's members).
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dignity and worth of every human being."" 90 College administrations can
protect the higher educational experience of individuals to freely exchange
ideas on campus without being harassed by racists, xenophobes, sexists,
homophobes, or ethnocentrists and without running afoul of the First
Amendment's injunctions.
With the advent of the Internet, university computer equipment can
also be used to spread propaganda attacking a group's purported racial,
religious, or ethnic inferiority. Canada has confronted a similar problem of
hate purveyors, like Ernst Zundel and Heritage Front,' 9 ' who used the
Internet to inflame prejudice and spread discrimination. The Canadian
Human Rights Act of 2001 addresses the increasingly common
transmission of information through the Internet and is applicable to
threatening or defamatory student speech.19 2 The law contains a provision
for penalizing anyone who repeatedly uses telecommunications devices,
including the Internet, to expose people "to hatred or contempt" based on
their "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual
orientation, marital status, family status, disability [or] conviction for
which a pardon has been granted."' 93 Prior to the addition of the section
addressing Internet communications, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld
restraints on telephonic dissemination of hate speech. The Court came to
its conclusion after balancing freedom of speech with other human rights
obligations. 194 Extrapolating the Court's reasoning to the campus hate
speech debate, regulations against hate propaganda may be adopted in
Canada to better promote "equal opportunity unhindered by discriminatory
practices."
France, like the United States and Canada, intrinsically values free
speech, asserting, in its declaration of rights, "[t]he free communication of
ideas and opinions" to be "one of the most precious of the rights of
' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
'9' See Charlie Gillis, Righteous Crusaderor Civil Rights Menace?, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 21, 2008,
at 22 (writing about the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal's hearings dealing with the Heritage Front's
hate messages); Mary Gusella, Chief Comm'r, Canadian Human Rights Comm'n, A Serious Threat,
Opening Address: Hate on the Internet Conference (Dec. 15-16, 2005), in CANADIAN ISSUES, Spring
2006, at 5-6 (describing Zundel's spread of group defamation on the Internet); Jail for German
Holocaust Denier, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 16, 2007, at 24 (mentioning Zundel's conviction in
Germany for Holocaust denial); Warren Kinsella, The Racist Face of SARS, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 14,
2003, at 60 (describing how a "supporter of the pro-Nazi Heritage Front" relied on the Internet).
192On the regulation of Internet hate speech, see Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace, supra note 172, at
820; Alexander Tsesis, ProhibitingIncitement on the Internet, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 6 (2002).
19 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, §§ 3(1), 13(l)-13(2) (Can.).
19 Canada (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (Can.) ("It can thus be
concluded that messages of hate propaganda undermine the dignity and self-worth of target group
members and, more generally, contribute to disharmonious relations among various racial, cultural and
religious groups, as a result eroding the tolerance and open-mindedness that must flourish in a multicultural society which is committed to the idea of equality.").
19s Id. at 895.
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man."1 9 Yet a student, faculty member, or visitor to a French university
who uses the Internet to send hateful messages, create discriminatory
webpages, or post comments on a newsgroup can be criminally prosecuted
for abusing that freedom. The threat of hate speech is taken so seriously in
France that it even requires Internet service providers ("ISPs") to "assist
law enforcement officers in eliminating online material that justifies crimes
against humanity, incites racial hatred or can be classified as child
pornography." 9 7 As the French government explains, the "precious" value
of "free communication of thoughts and opinions" does not preclude the
government from punishing the "incitement to discrimination, hatred and
violence."' 98 This legal sensibility, which is meant to preserve democratic
institutions, precludes the use of traditional free speech forums, including
newspapers, parks, and universities, from being converted into podiums of
defamation and incitement to harm.' 99 It also has implications for
regulating digital communication.
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris has established precedent
that allows for the criminal prosecution of hateful Internet content even
when its source is extraterritorial. 20 Plaintiffs, who included the union for
French Jewish Students, alleged that, by allowing the posting of hyperlinks
to auctions of Nazi memorabilia on its search engine, Yahoo! violated
R645-1 of the French Criminal Code. 20 1 The French court asserted
jurisdiction and rendered judgment over the corporation even though
Yahoo!'s computer servers were located in California. The court found
that it had the power to adjudicate the case because there was a "domestic
effect[]" in France of prohibited content that was accessible to French web

11 (Fr. 1789).
' Lyombe Eko, New Medium, Old Free Speech Regimes: The Historical and Ideological
'" DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CrTzEN art.

Foundations ofFrench & American Regulation of Bias-Motivated Speech and Symbolic Expression on
the Internet, 28 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 69, 102-03 n.208 (2006). French ISPs agreed to
filter materials depicting "child pornography, terrorism, or hate speech." Derek E. Bambauer,
Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 401 (2009). German law also allows for holding ISPs liable for
allowing users access to hate sites on the Internet. Timofeeva, supra note 173, at 264.
'98France in the United Kingdom: Freedom of Speech in the French Media, FRENCH EMBASSY
(May 24, 2007), http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Freedom-of-speech-in-the-French.html.
' Loi no. 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 tendant A r6primer tout acte raciste, antis~mite ou x6nophobe
[Law no. 90-615 of July 13, 1990 to suppress all racist, antisemite, or xenophobic acts], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN(AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 14, 1990, p.

8333. For an elaboration on a challenge made to the French law against Holocaust Denial, see
Faurisson v. France, Decisions U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 550/1993, U.N. Doc.
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/
available at
(1996),
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993
VWS55058.htm.
200The Tribunal's decision in the original French, with an English translation, can be found at
Appendix to the Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et
I'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated,
399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).
20' Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
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surfers.202 Another well-known French case involved the conviction of
Robert Faurisson, a prominent Holocaust denier.203 In that case the
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris found it had jurisdiction over the
criminal case, even though Faurisson had published his postings on a
server located in the United States?2 This was similar to the Canadian
Human Rights Commission's order requiring white supremacist Ernst
Zundel to remove antisemitic statements from his California-based website
that was nevertheless accessible in Canada.205 These precedents allow
French and Canadian courts to adjudicate cases where hateful materials
that give rise to causes of action are originally posted on American college
servers, far outside the countries' geographic boundaries.
German courts have likewise determined that they have the authority
to render judgments against hateful messages that can be accessed in that
country even though they were posted extraterritorially. Hate speech
originating on U.S. campuses may therefore be subject to German criminal
penalties. Germany's highest criminal and civil court, the Federal Court of
Justice, recently found that Gerald Fredrick Thben, the founder of the
Adelaide Institute, could be imprisoned once he arrived in Germany even
though his Holocaust denial was written on and posted from a computer
The court established that it had
located outside of Germany.206
jurisdiction over the case because*Tben had made his statements easily
accessible to Germans through the Internet.207 Toben's web posting
violated German criminal law because, as the court found, his distorted
statements about history disturbed the peace and contaminated the political
climate by making light of Nazi atrocities.20 8 The court sentenced him to
ten months in prison.209 More recently, in July 2009, Germany's Justice
202Gregory S. Cooper, A Tangled Web We Weave: Enforcing International Speech Restrictions in
an Online World, 8 U. PrrT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 2 & n.10 (2007).
203Russell L. Weaver et al., Holocaust Denial and Governmentally Declared "Truth": French
and American Perspectives, 41 TEx. TECH L. REV. 495, 499 (2009).
204 Maria Luisa FemAndez Esteban, The Internet: A New Horizon for
Race Hatred, in
DISCRIMINATION AND HuMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF RACISM 77, 103 (Sandra Fredman ed., 2001).
More recently the French Interior Minister announced that government negotiators had developed a
plan for French ISPs to filter sites containing racist speech. Bambauer, supra note 197, at 401.
205Georgios I. Zekos, State Cyberspace Jurisdiction and Personal Cyberspace Jurisdiction, 15
INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 36 (2007).
206Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Dec. 12, 2000, docket number 1 STR
184/00 (Ger.), available at http://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/l/00/1-184-00.pdf. Gerald Fredrick Toben
was a South Australian who set up a Holocaust denial organization known as the Adelaide Institute.
Emma Alberici, Alleged Australian Holocaust Denier Arrested (Austrl. Broad. Corp. television
broadcast Oct. 1, 2008).
207Yulia A. Timofeeva, Worldwide Prescriptive Jurisdiction in Internet Content Controversies: A
Comparative Analysis, 20 CONN. J. INT'L L. 199, 206-07 (2005).
208 Id. at 206.
209Terri Judd, Holocaust Revisionist Held at Heathrow, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 2, 2008, at
14. In 2008, Scotland Yard's extradition unit arrested Toben in London at the Heathrow airport on a
European Union arrest warrant that German authorities had issued. Id A British district court judge

HeinOnline -- 43 Conn. L. Rev. 651 2010-2011

652

CONNECTICUT LA WRE VIEW

[Vol. 43:617

Minister urged foreign ISPs to enforce their policies against spreading farright ideologies.210

The applicability of German, Canadian, and French hate speech laws
to extraterritorial defendants means that litigants in those countries can
effectively sue people who post hate speech on computers housed at
American universities. Even though Germany, Canada, and France will
apply their own laws to those cases, enforcement of judgments against the
purveyors of hate speech will prove difficult. The United States' free
speech doctrine is more libertarian, placing greater emphasis on expressive
autonomy than many European nations, and thus raising substantive
recovery problems.211 Ordinarily, U.S. courts enforce foreign judgments,
but they will not do so where the original judgment violates a party's U.S.
constitutional rights.2 12 A potential international comity dispute with the
French court was recently avoided when Yahoo! sought a declaratory
judgment from a federal court to prevent the enforcement of the judgment
of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, claiming that enforcement of
its judgment would violate the company's First Amendment rights.2 13
While the district court had entered a summary judgment for Yahoo!, the
Ninth Circuit reversed en banc, ultimately dismissing the case for lack of
ripeness, thereby avoiding the First Amendment and due process issues.214
ruled the warrant to be invalid and ordered Toben's release. "Holocaust Denier" Wins Fight Against
Extradition,DAILY MAIL (London), Oct. 30, 2008, at 43.
210Germany: Ban Neo-Nazi Sites from Abroad, JERUSALEM POST, June 9, 2010, available at
The German Multimedia Law punishes ISPs
http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=148187.
that publish their own hate speech; however, it does not hold ISPs liable for "hate speech posted by
third parties unless 'they have knowledge of such content and blocking its use is both technically
possible and can be reasonably expected."' Courtney Macavinta, U.S. Weighs German ISP Law,
CNET NEWS (July 7, 1997, 6:25 PM), http://news.cnet.com/U.S.-weighs-German-ISP-law/21001033_3-201212.html; see also Justus Reid Weiner, Referral of Iranian President Mahmoud
AhmadinejadandIran to the United Nationsfor Incitement to Commit Genocide and Other Charges, 3
INT'L J. PUNISHMENT & SENT'G 1, 17-18 n.100 (2007) ("Decisions by the German courts have
prompted ISPs to block access to sites containing hate speech or symbols of hate speech."). Germany's
approach has not only been passive, the country's justice officials have also threatened ISP companies,
like U.S.-based CompuServe or German Webcom, with prosecution for failing to self-police their
services for hate speech.

PETER JEPSON, TACKLING MILITANT RACISM

131 (2003); Shamoil

Shipchandler, Note, The Wild Wild Web: Non-Regulation as the Answer to the Regulatory Question, 33
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435, 445-46 (2000).
211See Tsesis, Boundaries, supra note 82, at 160 ("United States free speech jurisprudence is
anomalous.... [H]ere in the U.S.... intolerance and persecution can exist alongside free speech.").
212 See, e.g., Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 249 (Md. 1997) (finding that enforcement of
a foreign defamation judgment would have been contrary to public policy); Abdullah v. Sheridan
Square Press, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2515 (LLS), 1994 WL 419847, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994)
(dismissing a cause of action because establishment of a claim under British defamation law would run
afoul of the defendants' First Amendment rights).
213 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir.
2006) (per curiam); see also id. at 1220 ("[T]he harm to First Amendment interests-if such harm
exists at all-may be nowhere near as great as Yahoo! would have us believe.").
214Id at 1201; see also Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d
1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2004) (asserting that because it benefitted financially from its commercial dealings
in France, "Yahoo! cannot expect both to benefit from the fact that its content may be viewed around
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Even an unenforceable victory, however, can have communicative value,
deterring further publication on the Internet of hate materials on college
computers that degrade protected groups. While Yahoo! disputed the
order, it independently began blocking the sale of Nazi paraphernalia to
French users of its popular search engine.2 15
German penal provisions are part of a democratic system of
governance that provides a constitutional guarantee to enjoy "the right
freely to express and disseminate" ideas.216 TO further underscore the
importance of free speech, the German Constitution, known as the Basic
Law, prohibits censorship.2 17 On the other hand, restraints on symbols that
degrade historically vulnerable groups do not constitute an intrusion on
democratically protected freedoms.2 18 Universities in Germany, in addition
to other components of the country's social apparatus, are responsible for
preventing discourse from being used to instigate the mass violence that
219
While German history is unique and
was part and parcel of the Nazi era.
its legal sensibilities are particularly heightened to any racist
communications that are likely to stoke popular antisemitism, the United
States' history with slavery and Jim Crow laws also points to the need for
restrictions on the use of intimidating forms of hatred.220
European and Canadian speech laws emphasize the government's role
in prosecuting violations of human dignity. The first Article of the
German Basic Law, for example, imposes a national obligation to "respect
and protect" "[h]uman dignity." 22 1 A scholar pointed out that Germany's
"balancing [of] human dignity and freedom of expression" is more attuned
with Western democracies than "America's robust free speech

protection."222
In the United States, the Virginia v. Black model recognizes the state's
power to enforce criminal hate speech laws that prohibit intentional
the world and to be shielded from the resulting costs--one of which is that, if Yahoo! violates the
speech laws of another nation, it must wait for the foreign litigants to come to the United States to
enforce the judgment before its First Amendment claim may be heard by a U.S. court"), vacated, 399
F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).
21 Orin S. Kerr, Enforcing Law Online, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 745, 747 (2007).
216
GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I art. 5(1) (Ger.), translatedin BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 14 (Christian Tomuschat & David P. Currie trans., 2008) [hereinafter BASIC LAW],
available at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdfl80201000.pdf.
217
218

d.
id

219Antonio Brown, Academic Freedom in Western Europe: Right or Privilege?,
in ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AT THE DAWN OF A NEW CENTURY 115, 124 (Evan Gerstmann & Matthew J. Streb eds.,
2006).
220See TSEsIs, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 11, 25-28, 39-48 (discussing the
centrality of hate speech in Nazi Germany and the antebellum American South).
221 GG, BGBI. I art. 1(1), translatedin BASIC
LAW, supranote 216, at 13.
222 Guy E. Carmi, Dignity-The Enemy from Within: A Theoretical
and ComparativeAnalysis of
Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification,9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 988 (2007).
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intimidation; however, R.A. V's stricture against criminalizing simply
offensive speech would likely render unconstitutional any dignity
protection statutes.223 Despite the difference between the American and
German doctrinal treatments-with the United States being less inclined to
follow international standards for curbing genocidal and deprecatory
statements-dignity is by no means incompatible with our case law. But
in America dignity is protected by civil statutes, rather than by criminal
laws as it is in Europe. The Supreme Court in the seminal case on private
defamation explicitly stated that defamation law is meant to safeguard
"'our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
224
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."'
Germany recognizes that disparaging remarks based on race and
ethnicity are social offenses, not merely personal affronts. To that end, a
German criminal provision prohibits the distribution of any "written
materials . . . which describe cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of violence
against human . . . beings in a manner expressing glorification or which

downplays such acts of violence or which represents the cruel or inhuman
aspects of the event in a manner which violates human dignity." 2 25
German law has much to teach about democratic standards of
governance that do not interfere with core principles of free speech. Its
law prohibits: (1) incitement to hate directed at a segment of the
population; (2) advocacy to take "violent or arbitrary measures against
226
maliciously exposing others to contempt.227 In
them";226 and (3) insults
finding these standards to be constitutional, the German Constitutional
Court has balanced constitutional provisions against individual liberties in
a way that also makes sense in university settings. The state government in
Munich brought an action under the Public Assembly Act against
Holocaust denier David Irving for a speech he gave before the National
228
Democratic Party of Germany.28 The Court found the law did not violate
Basic Law Article 5(1)'s protection for the open expression of public
229
Its decision differentiated between opinions; which are
opinions.22
subjective, unverifiable statements, and statements of fact. Factually false
statements about the Holocaust enjoy no constitutional or statutory
protections in Germany because they are "untrue and cause[] harm to the
See supranotes 134-39 and accompanying text.
224
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
223

" STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Dec. 2007, § 131(1) (Ger.), translated in THE
GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 116 (Michael Bohlander trans., 2008).

§ 130(1)(1).
Id. § 130(1)(2).

2'Id
227

2 DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY
229 382-83 (2d ed. 1997).

1d at 383.
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reputation and dignity of Holocaust survivors and their families."230
Holocaust denial insults Jews by disparaging their sincerity and veracity,
making them the object of opprobrium.
A look at a few other cases will demonstrate how Germany
differentiates a fact from an opinion. A 1994 case that was also decided by
the Constitutional Court established that the right to free speech does not
protect individuals propagating the claim that the Auschwitz concentration
camp never existed. 23 2 A Berlin state court convicted a German neo-Nazi
leader in 1995 for also teaching that Auschwitz was a lie because the claim
spread "racial hatred and denigrat[ed] the state."233 Contrast these two
cases with the recitation of the opinion that Germany was not at fault for
starting World War II, which is a protected form of speech.234
Like Germany, England is more in accord with international
understandings about foreseeable dangers hate speech poses to pluralistic
order than is the United States.235 An English statute defines the spread of
racial hatred to include disparagements about a person's color, race,
nationality, and ethnicity. 23 6 To establish a prima facie case, a British
prosecutor must prove that the defendant either meant for the abusive,
threatening, or insulting words "to stir up racial hatred" or that "having
regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up
thereby."237 Violations can occur in either public or private places, but not
where the statements are made in a dwelling to others assembled there.238
In 2006, an additional provision was added to the Act prohibiting the
230RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE:
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 127 (2006).
231KOMMERS, supra note 228,
at 386.

232
James J. Black, Free Speech & the Internet: The Inevitable Move Toward Government
Regulation, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Winter 1997, at %y53, 56, http://jolt.richmond.edu/v4i2/black.html.
233
Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment: The Quest for Truth in a Free
Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35, 76 (1997); see also Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The
New German Law Against the "Auschwitz "-and Other- "Lies," 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 289-93
(1986) (discussing the German criminal code articles associated with the "Auschwitz lie," including a
synopsis of German federal supreme court case law from 1960 to 1985).
234
KOMMERS, supra note 228, at 387. An analysis of German constitutional law cases can be
found in Rainer Hofmann, Incitement to Nationaland Racial Hatred: The Legal Situation in Germany,
in STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 159,
167-70 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992).
235This is not to say, however, that the United Kingdom's hate speech standards are identical to
those found in international protocols. The United Kingdom on at least two occasions asserted some
reservations when it ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("CERD") by
creating a criminal offense rather than simply prohibiting by law, as the CERD requires, and requiring
a likelihood of criminal conduct rather than simply vilification of racial groups. FRANCESCA KLUG ET
AL., THE THREE PILLARS OF LIBERTY: POLITICAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS INTHE UNITED KINGDOM
175-76 (1996).
236Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 17 (U.K.), available at http://opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl986/pdf/
ukpga23719860064 en.pdf.
Id § 18(l).
238

Id § 18(2).
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spread of religious hatred.2 3 9 This is not to say that all religious criticism is
culpable.
To the contrary, the amendment explicitly protects the
expression of "antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular
religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents." 240
ISPs are required to contact the police National Community Tension
Team; failure to do so and violation of the ISPs' own terms of operation
can result in their administrative removal.24 1 In another indication of
progressive policymaking aimed at derogatory stereotyping, under the
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act of 2008, sexual orientation is now a
protected category.242
Purposeful and negligent disparagements fit the British criminal
definition of hate speech. This differs from the United States, where only
intentionally intimidating speech can be criminally punished.24 3 That is not
to say that the negligent-fault conception of speech is wholly distinct from
U.S. law, where civil penalties can attach for publicly spreading false
defamation. 24 In England and the United States, a university can punish
2

'Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c. 1, §§ 29A-29B (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/enacted. The Parliamentary committee that debated the
bill determined that it was needed to end the anomaly of some religious groups-like Jews and Sikhsbeing protected under the Public Order Act of 1986 while other religious groups were not. June 29,
2005, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2005), 3-4 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pal
cm200506/cmstandle/st050628/am/50628s01.htm. The British Home Office provided the following,
non-inclusive list of religions protected under the Act: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism,
Buddhism, Sikhism, Rastafarianism, the Baha'i faith, Zoroastrianism, and Jainism. Home Office
Circular 029/2007, Nat'l Archives (U.K), The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 9 (Sept. 5,
2007), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/publications/home-office-circulars/circulars-2007/0292007/index.html.
240 Racial and Religious Hatred Act, c. 1, § 29J. The Provision, as the Home Office described,
was designed to prevent intrusion on free speech while targeting threatening religious words and
materials intended to stir religious hatred. Home Office Circular 029/2007, supra note 239, at 2-19.
The 2006 Act does not include blasphemy. Lorenzo Zucca, The Crisisofthe SecularState-A Reply to
Professor Sajd, 7 INT'L J. CONST. L., 494, 496-98 (2009). Section 29J is designed to protect
statements made against a religion that are not meant to intimidate or put someone in fear of harm.
Gary Slapper, The Legality ofAssaultingIdeas, 71 J. CRIM. L. (U.K.) 279, 280-81 (2007).
241Home Office Circular 029/2007, supra note 239, at 122. Under the Public Order Act of 1986,
the ISP can be held liable even if it lacked racist or religious animus intent to distribute written
material, as long as "'having regard to all the circumstances' the publication was likely to result in
legally cognizable hatred. Michael Horn, Racism and Cyber-Law, 153 NEW L.J. (U.K.) 777, 778
(2003). Where, however, the ISP is a "'mere conduit,"' having no knowledge of the material's illegal
content, it will avoid liability. Id; see also Julia Homle, E-Collections & Legal Liability, UNIV. OF
LONDON, http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/Portals/12/Documents/PDFs/JHomle.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2010). Once the ISP becomes aware of the material, it must expeditiously take it down from its server.
Horn, supra, at 778; EUROPEAN COMM'N AGAINST RACISM AND INTOLERANCE, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS TO COMBAT RACISM ON THE INTERNET 46 (2000), http://www.coe.int/t/

dghl/monitoring/ecri/legal research/combat racism onintemet/CRI(2000)27.pdf.
242Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 2008, c. 4, § 74, sch. 16(a) (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/pdf/ukpga.20080004-en.pdf
243See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (suggesting that a state may regulate speech
that carries with it an intent to intimidate).
24 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("The legitimate state interest
underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by
defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State to abandon this purpose . . . .");
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defamatory comments made in either a public dormitory meeting or on a
college green. In other words, universities can impose various disciplinary
penalties without involving the criminal system.
Australia is another member of the British Commonwealth with hate
speech laws. Its constitution does not explicitly mention the fundamental
value of free speech, but its Supreme Court has long recognized it to be an
implicit constitutional right.24 5 An Australian appellate court found that
expressions meant to insult, humiliate, or intimidate others convey a
realistic risk of harming the democratic society that places a high value on
tolerance and political pluralism. 24 6 The recognition of insults as outside
the sphere of free speech goes beyond the U.S. precedents on hateful
incitements. 24 7 Mile university hate speech codes that prohibit the use of
insults and humiliating statements are unlikely to survive U.S. judicial
scrutiny because they would likely run afoul of the holding either in R.A. V
or in Black, Australia's promotion of tolerance and pluralism is entirely
compatible with American values. Universities can promote collegiality
on campuses by instituting anti-intimidation and group defamation
provisions without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Australia's approach to instigative speech is consistent with that of
European countries that have made the legislative connection between
instigative speech and the instigation of harmful conduct. They have
differentiated between instigation to commit ordinary criminal violence
and the expression of ideas or display of signs attacking vulnerable groups.
Denmark's criminal code prohibits the intentional dissemination of
statements relating information that threatens, insults, or degrades a group
Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (finding that "(libelous utterances [are] not . . .
within the area of constitutionally protected speech").
245 See Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp., 189 C.L.R. 520, 523-24 (1997) (Austl.);
Austl. Communist
Party v. Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 1, 262-63 (1951) (Austl.); Kathleen E. Foley, Australian Judicial
Review, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REv. 281, 313 (2007) (noting that the implied freedom of speech
"is now an established part of Australia's constitutional doctrine").
246Bropho v. Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Comm'n, 204 A.L.R. 761,
65 (2004). Antivilification laws in Australia were passed at differing times in various states. For instance, in 1991,
Queensland passed an anti-discrimination law against the advocacy of racial and religious hatred and,
in 2001, Victoria passed a racial and religious tolerance law. Mandy Tibbey, Developments in AntiVilification Law, 21 AUSTL. B. REV. 204, 204 (2001). The Victoria Act requires that the speaker intend
for the vilification to be heard by a third party, not only by the individual at whom it is directed. Anna
Chapman & Kathleen Kelly, Australian Anti-Vilification Law: A Discussion of the Public/Private
Divide and the Work Relations Context, 27 SYDNEY L. REv. 203, 204 (2005). Vilification is
understood to include "hate-speech, racist gestures or graffiti, racist material posted on Internet sites, or
through workplace intranet or email messaging systems, the distribution of pamphlets or stickers and
the wearing of clothing, insignia or badges with racist or derogatory religious meaning." Anna
Chapman, New Vilification Laws and Victorian and Queensland Work Relationships, 15 AUSTL. J.
LABOUR L. 277, 278 (2002).
247 The Australian balance between protecting free speech and prohibiting "racial vilification and
hatred" is directly linked to international obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination. Bropho, 204 A.L.R. at M57-62.
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of persons "on account of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin,
belief or sexual orientation." 248 Apparently, in recognition of the
importance free speech plays in Denmark's culture, the Danish Director of
Public Prosecutions has decided that the provisions of that law should be
read narrowly to prevent any interference with democratic institutions.24 9
In practice, this cautious method means the law applies only when
someone "'might provoke in someone serious fear for his own or other
persons'
lives, health or well-being, [or] threatens to commit a punishable
250
act."'
The rationale behind the Danish law has striking similarity to the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Black.25 1 One Danish case arose from a cross
burning incident "in the road outside a house" that the instigators "knew
was inhabited by Turks."2 52 This was reminiscent of the public cross
burning that two of the three defendants in Black had perpetrated to
intimidate a neighborhood resident.253 As in the U.S. case, the High Court
for the Eastern Division of Denmark convicted the defendants because they
chose the symbol for its historically intimidating message. 254
This case is distinct from circumstances involving the expression of
the opinion that Danish and American universities cannot prohibit hate
speech without infringing on individuals' deep sense of freedom and selfdetermination. Protected opinion was involved in complaints from the
Muslim Danish community regarding twelve cartoon images criticizing
radical Islam.255 The Director of Public Prosecutions for Denmark decided
248Christoffer Badse, The Test of Necessity in a European Context: The Case of Denmark 7,
http://www.badse.dk/Freedom%20of%/20Expression%20-%20The%2OTest%20of%20Necessity.pdf,
see also Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rep. on its 68th Sess., Feb. 20-Mar. 10,
2006, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/68/D/34/2004, at n.1 (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter CERD, Rep. on its 68th
Sess.], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/6715d3bdbeff3c0dc 125714d004f62e0?
Opendocument (translating Section 266(b)).
249Memorandum from Henning Fode, Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, Decision on Possible Criminal
Proceedings in the Case of Jyllands-Posten's Article "The Face of Muhammed" 8 (Mar. 15, 2006),
available at http://www.rigsadvokaten.dk/media/bilag/afgorelse engelsk.pdf.
250Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Considerationof Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, 1 36, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/280/Add.1 (May 3, 1995)
[hereinafter CERD, Consideration of Reports], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
STRAFFELOV
(quoting
doc.nsf/(Symbol)/b95ac4e38d06ddd58025654e005c7c9b?Opendocument
[PENAL CODE] § 266(b) (Den.)). This source is particularly helpful because it assesses the provisions
of § 266(b) and three convictions for violating it. CERD, Rep. on its 68th Sess., supra note 248, at IN
32-36,48-55.
251See supra Part I.B.
252CERD, ConsiderationofReports, supra note 250, at 56.
255Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 350 (2003).
254The Eastern Division of the High Court held that: "Under such circumstances, the High Court
found it indisputable that the act involved a threat, an insult or a degradation of the inhabitants of the
house on account of their ethnic origin and that the defendants were aware of this, and of the fact that
their statement would be disseminated to a wide circle; the Court consequently found them guilty."
CERD, ConsiderationofReports, supra note 250, at 156.
255See STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 181-82 (2008) (suggesting that,
despite charges that the cartoons amounted to hate speech, such charges were unfounded, and that
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not to proceed with criminal charges against the newspaper, presumably
because there was no indication that they were extremely derogatory or
posed any serious danger to the well-being of any group. 256 Similarly, to
avoid running afoul of the First Amendment, a university community could
only prosecute intimidating statements.
Finland is another country that honors free expression,257 but its law
nevertheless criminalizes the use of racial, ethnic, and religious threats,
slanders, and insults.258 An author and two newspaper editors were fined
in 2007 under Finland's hate speech law for antisemitic remarks made in a
published letter.259
The Swedish Constitution explicitly guarantees all citizens the rights
"publicly to express [their] thoughts, opinions and sentiments, and in
general to communicate information on any subject whatsoever on sound
radio, television and certain like transmissions, films, video recordings,
sound recordings and other technical recordings.,, 26 0 A provision of the
Swedish Penal Code, nevertheless, punishes anyone for spreading
"public discourse may not be restricted merely because it fails to conform to the religious principles of
some members of the society"). The cartoons were various. They included (1) an image of
Muhammad holding a walking stick trailed by a donkey laden with goods; (2) a depiction of
Muhammad with a crescent moon halo made to look like satanic horns; (3) a caricature of his face with
a crescent moon around it; (4) a man holding a knife with a sinister look and flanked by two women in
burqas; (5) a drawing of a man standing in front of heaven saying, "Stop, stop, we have run out of
virgins," to suicide bombers; (6) a drawing mocking the paper in which the comics were published,
with a school boy standing in front of a blackboard with the Arabic words, "'Jyllands-Posten's
journalists are a bunch of reactionary provocateurs'; (7) a caricature of an artist at a drawing table hard
at work drawing Muhammad, with sweat dripping from his brow and looking over his shoulder in fear;
(8) a lineup of various men in turbans, one with a complete halo around it, and a man trying to identify
them, but saying he cannot tell them apart; (9) an abstract image with the caption, when translated:
"Prophet you crazy bloke! Keeping women under yoke[!]"; (10) a drawing of a man holding his hand
to stop two sword- and bomb-wielding characters, saying "[r]elax guys, it's just a drawing made by
some infidel South Jutlander"; (11) a drawing of Muhammad in a turban containing a bomb; and (12) a
thin-necked character with an orange in his turban with the words "PR stunt." Danish Muslim
Cartoons, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/danish-muslim-cartoons/ (last
visited Nov. 4, 2010); Row Deepens over Danish Cartoons, NONE OF THE ABOVE (Feb. 10, 2006),
http://steelturman.typepad.com/thesteeldeal/2006/02/allahcartoons_ html.
256
See Edwin Jacobs, Cartoon Case: Denmark Will Not Prosecute, BRUSSELS J., Mar. 16, 2006,
available at http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/915 (reporting that the Director upheld an earlier
decision that the drawings received free speech protection, and noting the statements of a Danish
prosecutor that expressions subjecting groups of persons to scorn and degradation on account of their
religion or other characteristics did not constitute protected speech).
2s7CONST. ch. 2. § 12 (Fin.), available at http://www.finlex.filen/laki/kaannokset/1999/en
19990731 .pdf.
258PENAL CODE ch. 11, § 8 (Fin.), available at http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E8890039.PDF.
Actionable statements can be made "verbally, in writing, by illustration or by gestures." Lot Klo,
Mikko Ellili, Ethnic Agitation, Preliminary Investigation, LAIVA ON TAYNNA (Apr. 5, 2007, 7:02 PM),
http://laivaontaynna.blogspot.com/search/label/english.
259FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2008: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 257 (Arch Puddington et al. eds., 2008); Finland, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,

§ 2(c) (Mar. 11,

2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100558.htm.

260REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 1:1 (Swed.), available at http://www.riksdagen.se/

templates/R PageExtended_6066.aspx. An English translation of the Constitution may be found at
http://www.riksdagen.seltemplates/R Page
6316.aspx.
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"statements or communication[s]" that "threaten[] or express[] contempt
for a national, ethnic or other such group of persons with allusion to race,
colour, national or ethnic origin or religious belief."26 1 A 2003 amendment
to the law also criminalizes incitement against homosexuals.262 The
Swedish Supreme Court, in a 2005 decision, upheld this law. The opinion
distinguished between "objective criticism of certain groups," which the
country's constitution protects, and statements triggering criminal liability:
"Naturally, the principles of freedom of speech and the right to criticize
may not be used to protect statements expressing contempt for a group of
people, for example, because they are of a certain nationality and hence are
inferior."263 Government restraints must
never exceed that which is necessary in light of the purpose
for which it is created, and may not go so far as to constitute
a threat against the free exchange of opinions, which is one
of the foundations of democracy, and may not be done only
on the grounds of political, religious, cultural or other such
philosophy. 26
The free exchange of even harsh criticism of groups on campuses and
elsewhere is protected as long as it does not overstep the bounds of
"objective and responsible discourse regarding the group in question," but
intentionally threatening messages or those expressed in contempt of the
group are outside the scope of fundamental protections. 265 The true threats
provision of the Swedish decision is compatible with U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence.26 6
As in the United States and Sweden, merely opinionated racism or
ethnocentrism is not actionable in Norway. While access to information is
"a cornerstone of Norwegian democracy," 267 this principle is not a bar
against hate speech legislation. Norwegian Penal Code Section 135a
prohibits the intentional public use of racist, xenophobic, ethnocentric, and
261 BROTTSBALKEN [BRB] [CRIMINAL CODE] 16:8 (Swed.), available at http://www.sweden.gov.
se/content/l/c6/02/77/77/cb79a8a3.pdf.
262Prosecutor Gen. v. Green, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2005-11-29 p. 4
B1050-05 (Swed.), available at http://www.domstol.se/Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/
2005/DompaengelskaB_1050-05.pdf.
263 id.
26 Id. at p. 10. The European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance has recommended
that Sweden can continue guarding free speech while prosecuting and punishing racist, xenophobic,
and antisemitic speech on the Internet. EUROPEAN COMM'N AGAINST RACISM & INTOLERANCE,

COUNCIL OF EUR., THIRD REPORT ON

SWEDEN 32 (2004), http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XMLEcri/

ENGLISH/Cycle_03/03_CbC-eng/SWE-CbC-III-2005-26-ENG.pdf.
265 Green, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 2005-11-29, at p. 6.
266See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003) ("[A] state, consistent with the First
Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.").
267Kulturdepartementet
(Ministry of Culture), Media in Norway (Aug. 31, 1996),
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kkd/dok/veiledninger-brosjyrer/1996/Media-in-Norway.html?id=
419207.
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homophobic speech to threaten or insult others or to subject them to
hatred.268
This comparative analysis is meant to demonstrate that many
democratic countries have criminal statutes punishing hate speech. These
countries have found that pluralism is furthered by protecting the dignitary
rights of targeted groups.
V. FORMULATING CONSTITUTIONAL COLLEGE SPEECH CODES
The reasoning in Virginia v. Black, which recognized states' power to
prohibit intimidating cross burning, resembled international policies on
hate speech more than any other Supreme Court decision in this area of
law. The next case to reach the Supreme Court on the subject might
expressly reflect on the lessons of foreign jurisprudence and how to protect
free expression while prohibiting violent, group-based agitation. In Black,
the Court struck a delicate balance between the right of self-expression and
the social dangers of true threats. Integrity to the principles of the First
Amendment involves respecting self-expression while preventing
intimidation. Intellectual freedom is particularly critical to a university's
mission to preserve an open educational atmosphere, but threatening
discourse reviling particular groups of students detracts from their ability
to participate in campus activities. Hateful intimidation is particularly
incompatible with the university's role because it creates an insecure
environment that detracts from students' sense of safety. 269 Regardless of
268 STRAFFELODN [PENAL CODE] 13:135a (Nor.).
A translation of section 135a is available at
http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1690/file/c428fe3723fl0dcbcf983ed5914

5.htm/preview. See EUROPEAN COMM'N AGAINST RACISM & INTOLERANCE, COUNCIL OF EUR., THIRD

REPORT ON NORWAY (2004), at 27, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46efa2e52d.html (discussing
Norway's intention to establish "clear guidelines on how to carry out investigations in cases brought
under Article 135a"); Gro Lindstad, Norway, INT'L GAY AND LESBIAN HUM. RIGHTS COMM'N, at 133,
134 (2003), http://www.iglhrc.org/binary-data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/53-1.pdf (discussing
section 135a as it pertains to hate speech directed at gays and lesbians); Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Communication from Norway to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
Regarding the View in Communication No. 30/2003-The Jewish Communities in Oslo and
Trondheim et al vs. Norway 2-3 (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/
jd/prm/2006/0014/ddd/pdfv/273990-cerd replynorway.pdf (describing how the Norwegian government
has strengthened section 135a since 2004, providing the law with more effective provisions against
racist and ethnocentric speech). The applicable scienter standard for section 135a is found in section 40
of the Penal Code. STRAFFELODN [PENAL CODE] 3:40 (Nor.). A translation of Section 40 is available
at http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1690/file/c428fe3723fl0dcbcf983ed59
145.htm/preview.
269 The risk of intimidation is also high in grammar and high schools. Several state and local laws
prohibit it in public schools because of how much harassment detracts from the educational
environment. See 51 D.C. Reg. 3202 (2004) (finding that intimidation harms the educational
environment); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §7-424 (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring the Maryland Department
of education to report occurrences of bullying, harassment, and intimidation creating a hostile
educational environment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2010) (prohibiting intimidating acts
based on "race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and
expression, or a mental, physical or sensory handicap, or by any other distinguishing characteristic" on
school property).
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whether an individual displays a swastika, burns a cross, or delivers a
dehumanizing speech in a dormitory corridor or at a campus commons, the
alienating effect is the same. Those expressions of hatred are likely to
instigate violence, alienate students, create deep racial and ethnic rifts, or
make for a hostile learning environment. These expressions of hatred are
very different than a piece of art without any advocacy component. The
onus should be on the university's administration to prove that the charged
statements did intimidate or advocate discrimination, violence, or
exclusion. Parody, of course, would not fall under this definition since it
enjoys First Amendment protections.270
In balancing the interests of intimidated individuals and persons
wishing to express prejudiced opinions, the United States' free speech
tradition provides public university officials with less latitude to punish
group hatred than their administrative counterparts in countries like
Canada, Germany, and England. American jurisprudence is nevertheless
in accord with international findings that virulent forms of hateful
expressions pose a threat to public safety. International norms and foreign
laws on this subject suggest that hate speech is harmful to individuals as
well as groups. The risk of leaving hate speech unchecked on campuses is
that the targets of violent communications remain vulnerable to more
harassment. Because targeted groups and individuals are often uncertain
of their safety, they tend to be wary of pursuing the full breadth of
available educational opportunities, trying to avoid locations and activities
that might expose them to calumny or danger.
Black provides answers to most arguments put forth by opponents of
hate speech regulations. Larry Alexander, for one, argues that hate speech
is no more than verbal harm, conveying taunting ideas.27 1 Suzanna Sherry
is similarly dismissive of the gravity of harms flowing from hate speech.
She argues that regulation of it is driven by a political agenda that is
"designed to improve the virtue of an unvirtuous population." 272 She
criticizes the use of university hate speech codes for paternalistically
enforcing virtuous behavior rather than allowing students to be selfdirected.27 3 John S. Greenup takes this argument one step further, arguing
that university officials should grant organizations like the Ku Klux Klan
access to university locations unless their activities pose overt threats.274
This perspective recognizes the risk of intimidation, but fails to assess
270See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding that a parody of
Reverend Jerry Falwell was protected under the First Amendment from tort liability).
271Alexander, supra note 3, at 91.
272Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A RepublicanApproach to University Regulation of Hate
Speech, 75 MINN. L. REv. 933, 936-37 (1991).
273 Id. at 943-44.
274
John S. Greenup, The First Amendment: Does Hate Speech Deserve Protection?, 34 J.L. &
EDUC. 605, 612 (2005).
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whether tolerating an avowed terrorist organization like the Ku Klux Klan
on campus is threatening, divisive, and disruptive of teaching and
learning.275
The notion that counterspeech will adequately combat group hatred
and promote civil liberties, and is sufficient to maintain tolerance on
campus, which Nadine Strossen and the ACLU have advanced,276 has been
roundly rejected by the international community. 277 The U.S. Supreme
Court has now endorsed the consensus perspective on free speech policy.
Just as with sexual harassment in the workplace, counterspeech is an
inadequate remedy for the direct, intimidating attack of hate speech.278
Racism, chauvinism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia are too deeply
embedded in culture to be changed overnight. While public attitudes are
being changed, hate speech continues to menace out-groups. Telling a
university employee subject to racial or sexual coercion, racial
degradation, or ethnic insults to simply respond to antagonists provides
victims no legal redress but mere platitudes. Just as responding to
comments in a hostile environment does not solve the problem of
workplace harassment, neither does counterspeech decrease the risk posed
by advocacy groups committed to carrying out a campus campaign of
group intimidation, exclusion, and discrimination. Expecting students at
public universities to simply talk things out and convince those who
intimidate them of the fallacy of their threatening words and behaviors
fails to provide a procedurally cognizable way of seeking legal redress.
The mantra of more speech is based on libertarian faith that the world
275 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 389 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("To me, the
majority's brief history of the Ku Klux Klan only reinforces this common understanding of the Klan as
a terrorist organization, which, in its endeavor to intimidate, or even eliminate those it dislikes, uses the
most brutal of methods."). Justice O'Connor's opinion in Black actually sketches a history of the use
of the burning cross for purposes other than intimidation. Id. at 365-66 (majority opinion). Her
argument is weakest when it comes to the displays of terrorist groups, as these groups choose symbols
to both menace and express their ideology, and far more convincing when it comes to using hate
symbols for artistic depictions, as was the case with the film Mississippi Burning. Id. at 366. Even if a
prosecutor must prove a cross burners' frame of mind for burning a cross, the Klan's use will
invariably be linked to the organization's history of persecuting opposition and minority groups. See

DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE Ku KLux KLAN 272-73 (Duke

Univ. Press 1987) (1965) (writing about how burning crosses would trigger melees); GLENN
JEANSONNE & DAVID LUHRSSEN, A TIME OF PARADOX: AMERICA SINCE 1890, at 107-09 (2006)

(discussing the Klan and its use of burning crosses in the 1920s); Glenn Feldman, Soft Opposition:
Elite Acquiescence and Klan-Sponsored Terrorism in Alabama, 1946-1950, 40 HIST. J. 753, 777
(1997) (discussing the Ku Klux Klan in post-World War II violence).
276 Strossen, supra note 101, at 562-64; see also Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech, supra note 5,
at 772.
277See supra Part III.
278See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 421-22 ("[T]o the extent we allow verbal conduct creating a hostile
working atmosphere, we thereby refuse to protect persons from certain forms of private racial and
sexual discrimination. Conversely, to the extent that mere words can give rise to liability for
employment discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or other causes of action, we
acknowledge that an employer or co-worker can be punished for making such statements.").
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community discounted after it understood the effectiveness of antisemitic
Nazi propaganda.2 79 It also elevates harassment and intimidation to an
equal plane with dialogue. To the contrary, the former is a means of
disengagement with its reviled object, while the latter is a form of mutual
engagement between the interlocutors.
The potential harms are well illustrated by one of the most heinous
cases of school hate speech. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris revealed their
murderous intentions, laced with neo-Nazi terms, before their gruesome
attack against fellow students at Columbine High School. 280 Had a hate
speech policy been in place, school officials might have stopped them from
carrying out their plans. The school did not take adequate notice of their
wearing swastikas at school; writing essays about hatred, murder, and
destruction; and presenting a class video project depicting their planned
shooting spree.2 81 Similarly, Jeff Weise went on a murderous rampage at
his Red Lake, Minnesota, high school after extensive racial supremacist
282
comments he expressed at school and on websites like www.nazi.org.
Although not a hate speech case, the shooting spree at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University ("Virginia Tech") should be
mentioned in this context because it demonstrates the real risk of
administrative inaction. Before Seung Hui Cho killed thirty-two and
injured many others, he had written a story for his college creative writing
class depicting a young man killing fellow students before committing
suicide.283 Even though the creative writing professor informed university
officials of his concern about the violent nature of the composition,
university officials decided not to intervene.284 It became obvious that
279See

supra text accompanying note 106.
Harris and Klebold regularly wore Nazi swastikas, spoke of committing acts of violence, and
bragged about accumulating weapons. Tom Weber, Values Key to Stopping Kid Violence, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS (Me.), Oct. 12, 2006, at Bl. The young men also used Nazi salutes during bowling
games. Jodi Wilgoren, Eerie ParallelsAre Seen to Shootings at Columbine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2005, at A12. None of these things amounted to an imminent threat of conduct, but they could have
been enough to prevent the young men's conduct under the Virginia v. Black model proposed in this
Article. To prevent an attack similar to Harris and Klebold's, officials at one school recently reported a
student who threatened to shoot students at an indefinite time in the future and collected white
supremacist material, which led to his arrest. High School Tragedy Averted, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Fla.), Feb. 22, 2006, at 10A.
281In Brief CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 30, 2002, at 1OA; Weber, supra note 280.
282Chris Maag & Sarah Sturmon, Jeff Weise Lost His Parentsbut Had Close Friends,TIME, Apr.
4, 2005, at 35. At school, other students often noticed Weise's drawings of the Nazi swastika and his
conversations about guns. Id. He repeatedly described his desire to achieve ethnic purification, which
was known by other students. Id.
283Kristen Gelineau, Earlier Warning Could Have Saved Lives at Va. Tech, CENTRE DAILY
TIMES (State College, Pa.), Aug. 30, 2007.
284Sari Horwitz, Paperby Cho Exhibits Disturbing Parallelsto Shootings, Sources Say, WASH.
POST, Aug. 29, 2007, at A01. The lack of imminent harm, typically needed to prevent the expression
of violent ideology, seems to have brought officials at Virginia Tech to avoid confrontation with Cho.
Joseph Berger, Deciding When Student Writing Crosses the Line, N. Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007, at B7.
Using the Abrams v. United States model, officials might have feared penalizing Cho; they failed to
understand that his words were true threats and, therefore, were unprotected by the First Amendment.
280
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something should have been done. If the facts are changed and a student
writes a project publically extolling and advocating the eliminationist
ideologies of the Nazi Party, the Khmer Rouge, the Ku Klux Klan, or
radical Islamicism, or some such genocidal or violent organization,
universities should have means of dealing with what may amount to
realistic threats.
The Supreme Court regards the expressive use of symbols denoting
violence to be potentially dangerous enough for states to pass laws
prohibiting their public display without running afoul of the First

Amendment. 285 While solely preventing the display of hateful symbols
will not put an end to racist attitudes, 286 the state university can prohibit
intimidating, true threats.287 The criteria courts use for identifying whether
a communication poses a serious threat of unlawful violence assesses an
objective listener's sense that the threatened violence will occur.288 The
vitriolic speaker need not intend to commit the violence but only to
intimidate listeners.2 8 9 A similar consideration should go into hate speech
targeting an entire group, which threatens to harm any of its members.
Allowing students or faculty members to intimidate others through
hate symbols or expressions favors the bigots' desire to advocate
discrimination and violence while denying the victims' reasonable
expectation of security while on campus. 29 0 The constitutional importance
of the First Amendment to democratic governance and self-assertion does
not extend to menacing messages that tend to diminish the targeted group's
sense of security and its ability to enjoy college commons areas and to
attend university sponsored events.291 Students and faculty members are
Creative writing teachers have concerns about limiting speech different than constitutional scholars that
center on the squelching of intellectually creative impulses. April Simpson, Writing Professors Debate
Line Between Creativity, Peril,Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 29,2007, at B3.
285See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354 (2003) (associating Klan violence with burning
crosses).
286See Lee Ann Rabe, Note, Sticks and Stones: The FirstAmendment and Campus Speech Codes,
37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205, 226 (2003) (claiming that one problem with hate speech regulations is
that "[d]riving racist, sexist, and other discriminatory speech underground will not necessarily
eliminate a student's thoughts and emotions").
287See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (per curiam) (reciting that the First Amendment permits a state to
ban a "'true threat' (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969))).
288 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90
F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1996) ("While courts may consider the effect on the listener when determining
whether a statement constitutes a true threat, the final result turns upon whether a reasonable person in
these circumstances should have foreseen that his or her words would have this effect.").
289See Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 ('The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.").
290See Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in ConstitutionalJurisprudence:A ComparativeAnalysis,
24 CARDOzO L. REv. 1523, 1528 (2003) (arguing that the dangers hate speech poses should be based,
in part, on the context in which they are uttered); Kevin W. Saunders, The Need for a Two (or More)
Tiered FirstAmendment to Providefor the Protectionof Children, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 257, 267-68
(2004) (stressing that hate crimes indicate the danger racist communications can pose to a community).
291See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND 207

(2004) (observing that the First Amendment may "d[o] little to protect" the targets of hate speech, who
tend to "register[] their greatest advances when they act[] in defiance of the First Amendment").

HeinOnline -- 43 Conn. L. Rev. 665 2010-2011

666

CONNECTICUTLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43:617

more likely to think twice before going to hear the college orchestra or
heading to the student union if it requires walking through an area where a
cross has recently been burned, a swastika has been displayed, or a
supremacist rally has taken place. Hate speakers are neither inviting
intellectual debate and rejoinder nor seeking political dialogue. Theirs is a
campaign of silencing through intimidation-something that threatens the
university's "marketplace of ideas" and is no benefit to educational
interactions.292 Academic freedom is not a license for harassment. Neither
does hate speech further the pursuit for' truth: calling Jews vermin, blacks
apes, women whores, Native Americans savages, Tutsis cockroaches, or
Mexicans lazy has nothing to do with truth. These derogatory statements
are meant to exclude and stamp certain groups with the label of outsider to
Derisive speech becomes academically
the university community.
punishable when it is meant to defame, intimidate, threaten, terrify, or
instigate violence.
While Black provides college administrators with a good starting point
for preventing the use of hate speech on campus, it does not go far enough
in identifying expressive harms. Justice O'Connor's view for the plurality
that the First Amendment protects ideologically-driven cross burning not
meant to intimidate fails to recognize the symbol's intrinsically social and
political connections to the Ku Klux Klan's history of racial violence and
white supremacism. 293 The supremacist "statement of ideology," which
she distinguishes from "intimidation," symbolizes an organization's effort
and willingness to segregate and to create racially-polarized forums. 2 94
The same is true of other hate, exterminationist, or genocidal symbolssuch as swastikas or Hamas flags 29 5-that are displayed on campus to
292See Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination
Theory and the FirstAmendment, 37 VILL. L. REv. 787, 792 (1992) ("Hate speech frequently silences
its victims, who, more often than not, are those who are already heard from least.").
293 See Black, 538 U.S. at 365-66 (stating that some persons who bum crosses may intend to
express a racist ideology rather than to intimidate, or may neither intend to elaborate an ideology nor to
intimidate).
294 I make this inference from the fact that Virginia's cross burning statute had initially been
enacted in 1952 to prevent the particularly virulent expression of support for Jim Crow laws. See
Brief of Petitioner, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107), 2002 WL 1885898 at *2324 (describing the grounds for the Virginia legislature's adoption of the state cross burning statute).
295 Hamas is a genocidal organization whose charter uses violent antisemitism, calling Jews "war
mongers" who were behind all the world's revolutions, World War I, Word War II, and other
catastrophic human events. The Hamas flag is just as ideologically violent as the swastika, relying on
ancient Hadith to instigate mass murder:
[T]he Hamas has been looking forward to implement Allah's promise whatever time
it might take. The prophet [Muhammad], prayer and peace be upon him, said: The
time [Judgment Day] will not come until Muslims will fight the Jews (and kill
them); until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry: 0 Muslim!
[T]here is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him!
2010),
Oct. 24,
(last visited
FUND
THE JERUSALEM
Hamas Charter (1988),
The
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html.
presence of a Hamas flag signifies support for this genocidal plan.
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advance an ideological agenda. While the burning cross has a message
specifically linked to group violence in the United States, the swastika
symbolizes the worldwide effort to commit genocide against Jews and to
subject other non-Aryans to subservience. Its threatening message is
Further, many forms of hate speech are overtly
unambiguous.
dehumanizing, degrading, defamatory, and exclusionary.
In formulating a university hate speech code, it is important to
distinguish between disciplinary measures available to administrators and
punishments connected to criminal convictions. Educational penalties are
designed to negatively impact a student's or faculty member's record,
while criminal punishment is more onerous because it involves the
curtailment of liberty and greater social stigma. Educators can assess
penalties without following any rules of criminal procedure. The "beyonda-reasonable-doubt" standard is meant to prevent mistaken deprivations of
liberty, something that is unconnected to college sanctions.
Recognizing this contrast is important because the standard of proof
for a criminal hate speech law, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
is significantly more rigorous than what would be required for the censure
of student hate speech. The O'Connor plurality's requirement in Black
applies within the context of criminal liability, not civil penalties. If a
college hate speech code prohibits the use of a prima facie presumption of
a hate speaker's mental state, requiring a clear showing of intent, the
regulation would have no problem passing the plurality requirement.
College administrators are likely to have more latitude, however, because
this standard of proof applies to criminal cases, not administrative codes
like those that govern college campuses' activities.
The most closely analogous standard of civil liability comes from
defamation law. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court established that
a private plaintiff seeking to recover damages for defamation about a
public matter must prove that the defendant acted negligently. 296 That is,
liability for defamation only attaches in cases of negligent publication.2 97
To withstand judicial review of adverse university decisions against hate
296Gertz

v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
See id. at 347 (setting out the standard for liability for the defamation of private parties).
Defamation cases involving public figures conviction requires a showing of 'actual malice."' That
standard can only be met if the speaker published a statement with the "knowledge that it was false" or
the "reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 27980 (1964). Following up with the definition, the Court explained that, unlike the reasonable prudence
standard, "reckless disregard" occurs when a publisher actually "entertain[s] serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Unlike private
defamation, which is predicated on an objective standard, public defamation examines the publisher's
subjective state of mind. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989). A
plaintiff wishing to demonstrate the actual malice of a statement must present "clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained
serious doubt as to the truth of his statement." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 511 n.30 (1984).
297
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speakers, campus codes should include at least a negligence fault
component. This element must protect artistic and educational references
to words and symbols that might otherwise be punishable. The negligence
standard is applicable to campus hate speech codes, which cover a greater
set of expressions than the rather narrow tort of defamation. To avoid
running afoul of the First Amendment, the campus complainant would
need to demonstrate the speaker's negligence by a preponderance of the
Such a standard would require proof that under the
evidence.298
circumstances a reasonable speaker should have realized that hostile
expressions based on people's race, gender, religion, nationality, or sexual
orientation were likely to intimidate or harm the reputation of a defined
group or individual students. Gertz is as interesting for what it says as for
what it does not say: the Court retained a lower threshold for the private
plaintiff to demonstrate liability in issues of public interest, but it placed no
requirement for private parties to prove a culpable state of mind when they
sue for defamation about private matters.2 99
University hate speech codes can create different gradations of proof
predicated on whether the hate speech is private or public and at whom it is
directed. The highest degree of proof and, perhaps, punishment would be
linked to public matters about public figures. Here are a few examples to
clarify the distinctions: A fraternity that puts out a flier with racist epithets
against a college administrator reviling her for increasing tuition would be
making a statement about a public figure on a public matter. Under these
circumstances, defamation could only be proven, in accordance with
Sullivan, upon proof of actual malice. If the fraternity published a racist
flier about a fellow student's in-class statements about the tuition increase,
that would rise to the level of the Gertz negligence standard. Finally, if the
flier contained a racially derogatory remark against a student, and the
fraternity brothers had only overheard that student supporting tuition hikes
while talking to his parents on the phone, the university could resort to a
common law standard of defamation for adjudicating the appropriate
disciplinary penalty.
Defamation law had been established long before the decision in
298 See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) (finding, in a case where
a
newspaper published speech of public concern about a private figure, that "the Constitution requires us
to tip [the scales] in favor of protecting true speech"). The "substantial truth" of a statement can be
offered as a defense. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991).
299Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., asserted that First Amendment protections that apply to statements about
public matters are inapplicable in defamation suits brought by private parties to recover for defamatory
statements about their private conduct. 472 U.S. 749, 758-62 (1985). Applying this reasoning to the
facts of the case, the Court held that a credit statement was an individual interest that was not a matter
of public concern. Id. at 761-62. The case allows for state common law rules of defamation to apply
to private-matter defamation. See Roffman v. Trump, 754 F. Supp. 411, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("[T]he
[Supreme] Court has created few restrictions on state defamation law with respect to suits brought by
private plaintiffs based on speech relating to issues of private concern.").
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Black. That case demonstrated that historically violent symbols could
express a true threat that did not give rise to First Amendment protections.
Hence the display of a burning cross or swastika from a dorm window
would be a true threat that does not implicate the First Amendment.
The most difficult issues surrounding university hate speech codes
concern the much maligned group defamation standard. Earlier in this
Article, I presented an argument for the continued constitutionality of
group defamation statutes. 300 A caveat should be added here that Gertz
qualified Beauharnais: that is, if a private person makes a false public
statement against an identifiable group, the plaintiff must prove at least that
the publisher's conduct was negligent. The problem in group defamation
is not of a constitutional nature but of an evidentiary one, because the
bigger the group of students or faculty whose reputation is attacked, the
more difficult it is to prove harm to reputation. 30 ' Evidence of hate group
defamation requires the proof of harm as well as a showing of the previous
historical impact of false, derogatory statements tending to harm a racial,
ethnic, religious, gender, nationality, or sexual orientation group.
Where the defamed group is small enough, no such historical evidence
is necessary. For instance, falsely accusing a four-person partnership of
fraud because they are Jewish is likely to harm each partner's reputation.
Even if the statement did not name any of the four, the accusation
implicates each of them individually as Jews, providing each of them with
standing to file a lawsuit. Proving, however, that a false statement made
against a large group-for instance, purporting that the Holocaust is a hoax
spread by Jewish students-requires historical proof and will be far more
difficult to prove. The person filing a group defamation complaint with
university authorities would need to show that the content of the statement
would likely harm the reputation of an established campus organization or
an identifiable but diffuse group of students or professors. Proffering
historical evidence is crucial in the second scenario because, unlike the
See supra text accompanying notes 116-32.
Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
As a general rule no action lies for the publication of defamatory words
concerning a large group or class of persons. Unless the group itself is an
unincorporated association, as to which see § 562, it cannot maintain the action; and
no individual member of the group can recover for such broad and general
defamation. The words are not reasonably understood to have any personal
application to any individual unless there are circumstances that give them such an
application.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a (1977). The Restatement then asserts that, typically,
a small enough group to constitute an identifiable class for group defamation purposes involves twentyfive or less people. Id. § 564A cmt. b. Professor Nat Stern argues that the twenty-five-persons
standard is helpful for distinguishing whether the defendant had a reasonable certainty of the
statement's falseness. Nat Stem, The Certainty Principle as Justificationfor the Group Defamation
Rule, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 983-84 (2008). It seems to me that some of the most noxious forms of
group defamation, such as Holocaust denial, carry a great certainty of falsehood, probably rising above
negligence to malice, even though they harm far more than twenty-five people.
3

301The
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smaller group example, large-scale group defamation is difficult to link
directly to the alleged defamatory statement. I have demonstrated
elsewhere, through multiple examples, how racism, antisemitism,
homophobia, xenophobia, and chauvinism have been instrumental for
organizing hate crimes, rapes, slavery and genocide.302
Herein lies a paradox: Hate speech is more likely to instigate mass
crimes and atrocities when it is directed against a large ethnic, religious, or
racial group, but these complaints will be the least likely to succeed
because of issues of standing. Nevertheless, to assure the constitutionality
of a university group defamation code, university officials can rely on the
Illinois law upheld in Beauharnai.30 3 The college code might, for
instance, prohibit and punish any person or organization that uses
university facilities to manufacture, sell, advertise, or publish any
statements, graphics, or electronic communications that dehumanize,
attribute criminality to, or proclaim the depravity of a class of students,
faculty members, or college visitors based on their race, ethnicity religion,
sexual orientation, or gender.
The weakness with Beauharnais will be one of presenting evidence
tending to prove that a derogatory statement about a group caused students
or faculty actual and substantial harm. European norms recognize that
history provides ample cases of hate speech instigating violence. History
overflows with examples making it clear that propaganda was essential to
the Nazis' eventual genocide of Jews, the Hutu slaughter of Tutsis in
Rwanda,30 s the Islamist Arab Janjaweed continued mass murder and
302Elsewhere, I have developed a number of historical narratives of how supremacist groups rely
on hate speech to gain support for their movements. See TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note
26; Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence:A Historical
Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 740-55 (2000) (describing
historical lessons about hate speech and its consequences).
303In Beauharnais,the Court upheld the constitutionality of the following statute:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, or
offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state
any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or
exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of
citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition
exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or
obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots.
Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251, 266-67 (1952) (quoting 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 471 (1949)).
For a detailed study of the case, see supra Part1I.B.
3 For a detailed discussion on the development of German antisemitism and its influence on
Nazi politics, see TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 26, at 23-26; see also JOSEPH W.
BENDERSKY, A CONCISE HISTORY OF NAzI GERMANY 141 (2007) (describing Nazi exploitation of
traditional European antisemitism); EVANS, THIRD REICH, supra note 181, at 27 (describing the
interrelatedness of historical and modem antisemitism in Germany); SAUL FRIEDLANDER, NAZI
GERMANY AND THE JEWS: THE YEARS OF PERSECUTION, 1933-1939, 3-4, 110, 324 (1997) (discussing
the integration of European antisemitism in Nazi propaganda and its indoctrinating effect in Germany
and Austria).
35
0 See JEAN HATZFELD, MACHETE SEASON: THE KILLERS IN RWANDA SPEAK 55 (Linda
Coverdale trans., 2005) (describing radio broadcasts openly calling for Tutsi destruction prior to the
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enslavement of Darfurians,306 the ethnic slaughter during the 2007 Kenya
election,3 07 and the Turkish exterminationism perpetrated against
Armenians.308 Despite indisputable centrality of hate propaganda in mass
murder and hate crimes, the libertarian strain of American First
Amendment law denies the potential harm resulting from speech,
increasing the vulnerability of groups on campus.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued in this paper that the social and educational value of
regulating intimidating and defamatory speech on campus outweighs the
minimal burden it places on speakers. University hate speech codes raise
First Amendment concerns that can best be resolved within the framework
of Supreme Court jurisprudence on free speech. Public university officials
aiming to improve campus safety can formulate policies compatible with
the holding in Virginia v. Black. That case's applicability to the campus
hate speech controversy had been overlooked prior to this Article.
International conventions and laws on hate speech provide a wealth of
additional guidance on how to balance the requirements for public safety

1994 genocide in Rwanda); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM
NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 212 (2001) (quoting from the Hutu-power Kangura

newspaper, which dehumanized the Tutsis and called for their destruction); JOSIAS SEMUJANGA,
ORIGINS OF RWANDAN GENOCIDE 171-72 (2003) (providing an account of how racist ideology of the
1950s took root in Hutu politics and permeated the popular view of Tutsis).
3 Local authorities have periodically paid for the writing and performance of hate songs to
continue the instigation of the Janjaweed's most recent onslaught against black African Darfurians.
According to an Amnesty International report, one song's lyrics were:
The blood of the blacks runs like water
we take their goods
and we chase them from our area
and our cattle will be in their land.
The power of [Sudanese president Omer Hassan] al-Bashir
belongs to the Arabs
and we will kill you until the end, you blacks
we have killed your God.
(June 24, 2008),
Censored Singer Tries To Reform "Hate Singers," FREEMUSE
http://www.freemuse.org/sw28705.asp. This material was originally published in a Washington Post
video news segment. A woman's song went:
You are gorillas
you are black
and you are badly dressed
Id. Such lyrics likely soothe the conscience of murderers, rapists, and torturers as they pillage blacks,
seeking control of Sudan.
307Kenyan hate radio programs helped instigate violence between the Kikuyu and Luo peoples.
Kwamboka Oyaro, The Media Is Not Innocent, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews-41049; Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Tracing the Roots of
Ethnic Violence in Kenya (Nat'l Pub. Radio television broadcast Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=1 8582319.
308

See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, WORSE THAN WAR: GENOCIDE, ELIMINATIONISM, AND THE

ONGOING ASSAULT ON HUMANITY 209-10 (2009) (discussing how longstanding Turkish prejudice
played a central role in the instigation of slaughter against Armenians).
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against the interests of vitriolic speech. The policy of each state will
inevitably be linked to its constitutional scheme, but the nearly universal
recognition of group defamation should be further reflected in American
universities' administration. Misinformation about the demise of group
defamation should give way to careful analysis of how that actionable
category of hate speech has been impacted but not abrogated by the
elements of public slander.
Sanctions that punish the intentional dissemination of intimidating
racist, xenophobic, homophobic, antisemitic, and chauvinistic messages on
campus do not interfere with constitutionally protected free speech. Like
the cross burning statute in Black, campus regulations can prohibit the
College
public display of historically threatening symbolism.
administrators need not, however, require proof of intentional intimidation
because the sanctions available to them are far less onerous than criminal
penalties. Negligently placing others in apprehension of harm or asserting
false facts that damage their reputations can be punished by suspension,
disenrollment, or withdrawal.
Restrictions on intimidating and defaming students and university
employees do not conflict with the university's mission to openly foster the
discussion of ideas. Hate speech is unrelated to the pursuit of truth, and the
interest in public order justifies reasonable limitations on its dissemination
on campuses.
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